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Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilyingt
I. BENNETT CAPERS*
INTRODUCTION
United States v. Restrepo 1 is not a famous case. It applied no new law. The facts are
not unusual. The defendants were drug dealers. They were arrested in the act. They
made motions to dismiss, some of which were granted, some of which were denied.
And most of the defendants were convicted following guilty pleas. In many ways,
Restrepo is a typical case. But its very typicality is what makes it interesting.
Interesting, and illustrative of a much larger problem of over-enforcement and under-
enforcement, and of crime, legitimacy, and "testilying."
Here are the facts: one of the defendants, Jose Francisco Guevara, was arrested
because he was allegedly driving sixty-five miles per hour in a fifty-five miles per hour
speed zone. Except the traffic stop involved not only an officer issuing Guevara a
"courtesy warning," but also asking Guevara whether he was "Mexican" and
summoning an additional officer to the scene. The officers then asked Guevera, who
was traveling with his wife and two small children, for consent to search his vehicle.
Though Guevara later disputed the scope of his consent, what was not disputed was
that a search in fact occurred, and that approximately sixty kilograms of cocaine were
found secreted within the side panels of Guevara' s car. The problem arose during the
motion to suppress. As Judge Weinstein later put it:
Defendant Guevara, with the aid of an interpreter, testified that he was driving
slowly at the time he was stopped because he was looking for a place for his
family to have breakfast. This was confirmed by [Guevara's eleven-year-old son]
Rodolfo. The defendant further confessed to the court that he was purposely
driving under the speed limit because, knowing that he was carrying drugs in his
vehicle, he did not want to attract the attention of police.
Rodolfo, the young boy, acted as an interpreter between his father and the
officer. Both the child's and the defendant's testimony at the suppression hearing
t Copyright © 2007 by I. Bennett Capers.
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1. 890 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Weinstein, J.).
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contradicted the police's version as to whether and how valid consent was
obtained for a full search of the vehicle. Also troubling was proof of the incentive
for these officers to trim their testimony because of the way in which asset
forfeitures could directly benefit their local police department.
Based on the totality of the evidence presented, a violation of the Fourth
Amendment was found. The officer did not have a proper basis for conducting a
traffic stop. The court could not tolerate this evident abuse of the Fourth
Amendment.
2
Judge Weinstein concluded that the officers had not stopped Guevara for the
legitimate reasons they claimed-that he was driving ten miles per hour above the
speed limit-but instead "because he was driving a car with out-of-state license plates
and appeared to be Hispanic." 3 In making this factual determination, the court also
made a credibility finding that the first and second officer at the stop lied.4 The result:
the government's sole evidence against Guevera was suppressed, and the charges
against Guevera were withdrawn.
This typical case illustrates over-enforcement insofar as it exemplifies the
disproportionate targeting of people of color; that is, the undemocratic policing and
inegalitarianism of racial profiling which has been the focus of much of the critical
literature. It also illustrates a type of under-enforcement. As a result of judicially
created exclusionary rules, the government was compelled to forego prosecution of an
individual found in possession of illegal narcotics. These rules, which are viewed by
many as inhibiting the apprehension and conviction of offenders, thus contribute to an
under-enforcement of the law. Here, too, the literature is substantial.
But Restrepo also illustrates the convergence of over-enforcement and under-
enforcement in another respect, one that has not been sufficiently attended to by
scholars, but one that would be readily apparent by following Man Matsuda's
suggestion of "looking to the bottom" and adopting the perspective of those who have
experienced discrimination.5 From this (disad)vantage point, it is not only the fact that
Guevera was apparently a victim of racial profiling that is relevant, but also the fact
that the officers apparently lied about their true motivation for stopping Guevera.
For many people of color and members of other politically vulnerable groups,
neither of these facts comes as a surprise. Nor should the fact that the frst and second
officers misrepresented the facts come as a surprise to others. In New York, the Mollen
Commission found that perjury was "so common in certain precincts that it has
spawned its own word: 'testilying." 6 Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit has
2. Honorable Jack B. Weinstein & Mae C. Quinn, Terry, Race, and Judicial Integrity: The
Court and Suppression During the War on Drugs, 72 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1323, 1337-38 (1998)
(citations omitted).
3. 890 F. Supp. at 194.
4. Id. at 191.
5. See Man J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987).
6. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, CITY OF NEw YORK, CoSmISON REPORT 36
(1994) (Milton Mollen, Chair) [hereinafter MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT]; see also Joe Sexton,
New York Police Often Lie Under Oath, Report Says, N.Y. TImEs, Apr. 22, 1994, at Al.
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observed that it is "an open secret long shared by prosecutors, defense lawyers and
judges that perjury is widespread among law enforcement officers."7 Nor is testilying's
attendant circumstance, the environment that allows testilying to flourish, surprising.
Despite the common knowledge that law enforcement peijury occurs, prosecutions are
extremely rare. Viewed from this perspective, in Restrepo, it was not only Guevara
who evaded criminal punishment and thus benefited from under-enforcement, but also
the first and second officers.
At its broadest level, this Article examines how the zone of law enforcement, once
the mirror is turned, is also a zone of under-enforcement.8 Except in the most
egregious cases-those involving brutality or death, for example-law enforcement
officers can engage in otherwise sanctionable and criminal behavior usually without
fear of consequences. The point of this Article, however, is not to engage in ajeremiad
against police wrongdoing. Rather, the point of this Article is to articulate an argument,
acceptable to those on the left and those on the right, to civil libertarians and law and
order advocates, and ultimately to the police themselves, for why there should be a
more democratic policing of police officers. 9 Essentially, this Article builds upon
legitimacy theory to make a utilitarian argument: more policing of the police, far from
tying the hands of law enforcement, can actually work to reduce crime in the general
community.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I of this Article begins the argument by
reviewing the research of social psychologist Tom Tyler on legitimacy and
compliance, as well as subsequent work by other scholars. Collectively, this literature
reveals that perceptions of legitimacy play a critical role in inducing compliance with
the law, and conversely, that perceptions of illegitimacy induce non-compliance. As
should be evident, legitimacy theory has particular implications when it comes to
under-enforcement and the police, which implications are taken up in Part II.
Specifically, Part II "looks to the bottom" by examining the perception, especially
prevalent in minority and poor communities, that police benefit from a double
standard: that they are our designated enforcers of the law, but too often function
outside of the law themselves. In short, the perception is that the police themselves
engage in undemocratic policing and, indeed, that this illegitimacy is enabled by the
courts. Building upon these points, Part III returns to the argument that increased
policing of the police-by holding them accountable for unlawful actions-would
contribute to community acceptance of the law as legitimate and, as a consequence,
increase voluntary compliance with the law. Of course, there should be increased
policing of the police across the board: from officers who violate traffic regulations
7. Stuart Taylor, Jr., For the Record, Am. LAw., Oct. 1995, at 72.
8. In using the term "zones," this Article borrows from the work of Gerald Neuman, as
well as the work of Alexandra Natapoff. See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1721 (2007) (noting that "the United States is peppered with all sorts of
underenforcement zones, arenas in which underenforcement has reached systemic proportions
that affect the local quality and meaning of lawfulness."); Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones,
48 STAN. L. REv. 1197, 1201 (1996) (identifying Guantanamo, formal "red light districts," and
the District of Columbia as "anomalous zones" in which "certain legal rules, otherwise regarded
as embodying policies of the larger legal system, are locally suspended.").
9. See generally David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MicH. L. REv. 1699
(2005).
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(and the officers who give fellow officers a pass by declining to ticket them) to officers
who engage in unjustified acts of violence. However, as a case in point, Part I returns
to "testilying," documenting the perception of its prevalence, and proposes reforms to
increase the policing of testilying. Because this Article challenges the status quo of
under-enforcing crimes committed by law enforcement officers, as well as the status
quo of granting prosecutors unlimited discretion, it is almost certain that there will be
arguments raised in opposition. Part IV anticipates and addresses those arguments, and
marshals the many countervailing arguments that support reform.
The conclusion, which again should be acceptable to liberals and conservatives
alike, is that the collateral benefits to righting the under-enforcement imbalance-and
there are many-far outweigh the drawbacks. In fact, this Article's proposal would not
only benefit communities by reducing crime; it would also benefit the police
themselves. Quite simply, it is a win-win proposal.
I. LEGITIMACY AND CRIME
A. Legitimacy and Crime Reduction
The general assumption is that individuals comply with the law to avoid
punishment. The more severe and certain the punishment associated with a particular
crime, the more individuals will desist from engaging in that crime.' 0 Or so the
thinking goes. This deterrence-based theory of compliance, however, now seems to be
only partially true. Rather, at least equally important are the roles societal and
community norms play in policing behavior and compliance with the law. In its
simplest terms, if a person believes that a particular law makes sense and is fair, for
example, a law prohibiting stealing, that person is likely to comply whether
punishment is likely or not. Conversely, if a person believes that a particular law does
not make sense, or is arbitrary or unfair, for example, a law prohibiting jaywalking,
that person may be more likely to disregard the law entirely. A similar result occurs if a
fair law is perceived to be unfairly applied.
Perhaps no scholar has been more influential in exploring the limits of punishment
as a criminal deterrent than social psychologist Tom Tyler. In his highly influential
Why People Obey the Law," as well as in his more recent work on motive-based
trust, 12 Tyler explores the extent to which normative factors, including perceptions of
legitimacy, influence compliance with the law. His extensive research suggests that, by
increasing respect for the law as both fair and fairly applied, lawmakers can in fact
increase voluntary compliance with the law.'
3
10. Economist Gary Becker, for example, characterizes criminal sanctions as "prices" and
suggests that criminals weigh whether the benefit to be obtained from engaging in criminal
activity exceeds its price. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76
J. POL. ECON. 169, 194-96 (1968); see also George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of
Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970).
11. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
12. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social
Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361 (2001); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND CouRTs 49-96 (2002).
13. See TYLER & Huo, supra note 12, at 67-68.
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This is not to suggest that Tyler's legitimacy argument is entirely new or without
antecedents. As Tyler acknowledges, previous sociological studies could be interpreted
as broadly supporting the conclusion that normative support for a legal system leads to
compliant behavior.' 4 Legal philosophers had also theorized a link between
perceptions of fairness and compliance. For example, H.L.A. Hart noted that
punishment must be proportionate to the severity of the crime; otherwise, there was a
risk "of either confusing common morality or flouting it and bringing the law into
contempt."' 5 Paul Robinson and John Darley have noted that public compliance with
the law is tied to community norms about what should be punished, and to what extent:
the more the law is in line with such community norms, the more likely it is that
community members will voluntarily comply with the law. 16
Tyler's contribution lies in his attention to citizen/police interactions and the
process by which laws are enforced-what Tyler terms "procedural justice"-and his
use of empirical evidence to support the theory that legitimacy enhances compliance.
Tyler's Chicago study, which he has since replicated elsewhere, is illustrative. Tyler
compiled data collected in a longitudinal study of randomly selected Chicago residents
to explore the question of whether legitimacy affects compliance. 17 At its most basic,
the study found a zero-order relationship between compliance and legitimacy. 8 The
more an individual regarded legal authorities as exercising legitimate authority, the
more that individual was likely to obey the law. 19 Indeed, by assigning legitimacy
scores and computing levels of compliance, the study found that the relationship
between legitimacy and compliance is linear: as legitimacy increases, so does
compliance, even when regression analysis is used to control for other factors.
20
The Chicago study also found that the interviewee's experience with police officers
influenced his or her view of the legitimacy of legal authority. Specifically, the study
suggests that approximately five percent of the variance in people's views about
legitimacy can be explained by the nature of a recent experience with law
enforcement. 2' The significance of this cannot be overstated. As Tyler notes:
Personal experience does have political impact. The judgments of adults about
their obligation to follow legal authorities respond to their experiences with
particular police officers and judges. Because experience influences legitimacy,
legal authorities cannot take citizens' allegiance for granted. It can be eroded by
unsatisfactory experiences with police officers or judges. And legitimacy will be
eroded if the legal system consistently fails to meet citizens' standards. On the
14. See id. at 3-9.
15. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILrrY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 25
(1968).
16. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453,
497-99 (1997).
17. The study, conducted in two waves, focused on information gathered from telephonic
interviews with respondents who had had personal experiences with legal authorities. TYLER,
supra note 11, at 8-15.
18. Id. at 57.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 57-60.
21. Id. at 106.
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other hand, the existing reserve of legitimacy can be increased over time by
positive personal experiences with police officers and judges. 22
Tyler's legitimacy theory has particular significance when it comes to race, given
the grossly disproportionate offending and incarceration rates of blacks and
Hispanics. 23 As part of his continuing legitimacy research, Tyler recently examined the
views of blacks and Hispanics, with a particular focus on a subcategory of "high risk"
individuals, namely black and Hispanic males between the ages of 18 and 25.24 His
findings were consistent with his Chicago study: the perception of procedural justice
plays a significant role in shaping the willingness of blacks, Hispanics, and "high risk"
individuals to defer to authority. 25 His findings have not gone unnoticed. Several
scholars-Tracey Meares, for example-have done interesting work in advocating the
incorporation of legitimacy theory in approaches to crime control in minority
communities.26
But legitimacy and compliance are only part of the equation. A separate question is
the converse: can perceptions of illegitimacy contribute to non-compliance? This
question is equally important.
B. Legitimacy and Increased Crime
If the perception of legitimacy contributes to voluntary compliance with the law and
social norms, does it follow that the perception of illegitimacy contributes to non-
compliance? While the research in this area is in its nascent stages, clearly this makes
intuitive sense. Indeed, Justice Brandeis argued as much in his oft-cited dissent in
Olmstead v. United States: "If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
22. Id. Tyler has identified three relational judgments as being important: neutrality,
trustworthiness, and status recognition.
First, people react to the neutrality of the decision maker. This includes
assessments of that person's evenhandedness, their lack of bias, and their
willingness to make factual, objective decisions. Second, they react to their
inferences about the trustworthiness of the decision maker's motives, that is,
whether they believe that the authority is benevolent and caring. Finally, they
react to the respectfulness of their treatment by the decision maker (i.e., the degree
to which their status is recognized through polite treatment and respect for their
rights).
Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal
Authorities, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 983, 991 (2000).
23. As the Sentencing Project has recently noted, "one in three black males born today can
expect to spend time in prison during his lifetime" as opposed to a one in seventeen chance for
white males. MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF INCARCERATION
By RACE AND ETHNIcrry 2 (2007), available at http://sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/
publications/rd_stateratesofincbyraceandethnicity.pdf.
24. See generally Tyler, supra note 12.
25. Tyler, supra note 12, at 375-82.
26. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REv.
391 (2000); Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 191 (1998).
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contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy."27
Legal scholars have also assumed a link between perceptions of illegitimacy and
increased crime. David Cole, for example, has long argued that the belief that the
criminal justice system is unfair in fact contributes to lawbreaking.28 James Forman
has also made this argument. 29 Empirical support for this proposition, however, has
been lacking.
Scholars such as Janice Nadler are now beginning the process of filling this
empirical gap. Terming the perceived link between illegitimacy and non-compliance
the "Flouting Thesis," 3 Nadler conducted experiments in which she exposed
individuals to instances of legal injustice and then measured their willingness to break
the law in their everyday lives. For example, in one experiment, she provided
participants with several news stories, three of which discussed proposed laws. Half of
the participants were provided stories designed to elicit a perception that the proposed
laws were just; the other half were provided stories designed to elicit a perception that
the proposed laws were unjust.3 1 Although the participants were told that researchers
were interested in their emotional reactions to the quality of the writing and the style of
journalism, upon reviewing the news stories, the participants were also asked to
complete a questionnaire. Nadler designed the questionnaire to elicit the likelihood that
participants would engage in a variety of petty crimes. 32 The results indicated that
participants primed with stories designed to elicit an unjust perception of the law were
significantly more willing to disregard the law or conventions in their own lives by
parking illegally, copying unlicensed software, consuming grocery items without
paying, and pocketing office supplies.33
Janice Nadler's research does have its limitations. Expressing a willingness to
engage in petty crime does not necessarily translate into actually engaging in petty
crime. Nor does expressing a willingness to engage in petty crime necessarily indicate
a willingness to engage in more serious crime. These limitations aside, Janice Nadler's
research does substantiate a converse legitimacy theory, as do other studies.34 And
27. 277 U.S. 438,485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
28. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTIcE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 171-72 (1999).
29. See generally James Forman, Jr., Children, Cops, and Citizenship: Why Conservatives
Should Oppose Racial Profiling, in INVIsIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
MASS IMPRISONMENT 150 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (arguing that inner
city youth respond to racial profiling and other undemocratic policing by disregarding
authority).
30. Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2005).
31. Id. at 1410-13. The "unjust" news stories discussed actual civil forfeiture laws,
proposed income tax legislation, and proposed legislation to permit landlords to conduct
warrantless searches of tenants' apartments. Id. at 1412-13. The first and third stories
emphasized civil liberties concerns, while the income tax story emphasized the negative impact
the proposed legislation would have on those in the middle class. Id. The "just" stories
discussed the same proposed legislation, but were slanted to emphasize their positive and
beneficial aspects. See id.
32. Id. at 1413-14.
33. Id. at 1414-15.
34. For example, a recent study of parking tickets issued to United Nations diplomats found
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while Nadler's focus was on how individuals respond to unfair laws, there is reason to
believe that a similar result would obtain in a study of responses to the unfair
application of otherwise fair laws. 
35
The foregoing suggests that just as perceptions of legitimacy contribute to voluntary
compliance with the law, perceptions of illegitimacy contribute to non-compliance. Or
to put it more simply, there is a causal link between the perception of the law and
levels of compliance. Unfortunately, the perception in many poor and minority
communities is that the law, as exemplified by the police, is illegitimate, a perception
that encourages non-compliance. This perception holds true of white and minority
officers alike.36 This Article contends that changing this perception will in fact lead to
a reduction in crime. However, a prerequisite to changing this perception is
understanding it. This task is taken up below.
II. THE PERCEPTION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AS ILLEGITIMATE
Allow a digression which, perhaps is not a digression at all: the O.J. Simpson case,
which continues to engender controversy. A case ingrained in the public memory. The
"live coverage" of the police chasing O.J. Simpson's Bronco in hot pursuit. The
a correlation between the number of unpaid tickets run up by a diplomat and his country's views
of U.S. laws. As one of the Columbia University researchers noted, "It's much easier to flout the
law if you tell yourself that the government that is making these laws or enforcing these laws
lacks legitimacy." See David B. Caruso, Not-So-Friendly Diplomats Park Where They Please,
MIMvI HERALD, July 7, 2006, at 7A.
35. In the domestic violence context, for example, offenders who felt they were treated
unfairly by the police were thirty-six percent more likely to be reported for subsequent acts of
domestic violence against the same victim within six months. Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance,
Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ.
445,463 (1993) (citing study); see also Raymond Paternoster, Robert Brame, Ronet Bachman,
& Lawrence W. Sherman, Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on
Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 163, 176-82 (1997).
36. Minority officers are not beyond engaging in racial or class-based profiling, or
testilying, or using excessive force, as the recent shooting of Sean Bell by minority officers
demonstrates. One explanation for minority officer offending is that minorities internalize many
of the negative perceptions of the dominant culture. Indeed, these internalized negative
perceptions were evidenced in Kenneth Clark's "doll study," which was one impetus for the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). See
Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie P. Clark, Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children, in
READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 169-78 (Theodore M. Newcomb & Eugene L. Hartley eds.,
1947). More recent social cognition research confirms the persistence of internalized biases.
Performance theory provides a second explanation. In short, to make themselves acceptable to
fellow officers, minority officers "perform" as they believe majority officers would. For more
on performance theory and how it rewards minorities who engage in assimilationist and
"comfort strategies" to fit in, including strategies that are harmful to their minority group, see
generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1259
(2000). For an analogous argument in the gender context, see Ramit Mizrahi, Note, "Hostility to
the Presence of Women ": Why Women Undermine Each Other in the Workplace and the
Consequences for Title VII, 113 YALE L.J. 1579, 1602-03 (2004). Third, employers are more
likely to hire minority officers who are "racially palatable" and accept majority norms. For
more on this phenomenon, see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of
Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1792-93 (2003) (book review).
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witness stand image of Mark Fuhrman, the cop who found the bloody glove, and who
lied about making racist remarks.37 O.J. Simpson himself, his hand squeezed too
tightly in the aforementioned glove; and O.J. Simpson not himself, but darkened for
the cover of Time magazine. 38 Nicole Simpson Brown's bruised and battered face. The
look of shock, surprise, relief on Simpson's face when the jury, after 252 days of trial
and less than five hours of deliberating, returned a not guilty verdict on all counts. And
the repeated images of black jubilation over Simpson's acquittal, and the contrasting
images of white anguish.
This reference to the Simpson case is not to weigh in on actual guilt or innocence.
Rather, the Simpson case serves as an entry point for drawing attention to the chasm
between black and white perceptions about the fairness of the criminal justice system
in general.39 Poll after poll showed that the majority of blacks believed Simpson to be
innocent, and the majority of whites believed him to be guilty. 4° The trial and the polls
also revealed to the public at large the view shared by many blacks and other
minorities that the system itself is illegitimate and undemocratic, especially when it
comes to the police, the most public face of the criminal justice system. This different
view of the system was so significant that President Clinton addressed the matter,41 as
did former Attorney General Janet Reno. As she later noted during a speech on police
misconduct, "[T]he perception of too many Americans is that police officers cannot be
trusted .... Especially in minority communities residents believe the police have used
excessive force, that law enforcement is too aggressive, that law enforcement is biased,
disrespectful, and unfair., 42 Again, this perception holds true of white and minority
officers.
37. Under oath, Fuhrman denied using the word "nigger" in the past decade. Audiotape
recordings of Fuhrman using the word contradicted his denial. See Jeffrey Toobin, A Horrible
Human Event, NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 40, 41-42.
38. Time Magazine Darkens and Blurs O.J. Simpson Mug Shot, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June
21, 1994; Howard Kurtz, Time's 'Sinister' Simpson: Cover Photo Was Computer-Enhanced,
WASH. POST, June 22, 1994, at D1; see also Peter Arenella, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on
the Implications for the Criminal Justice System-Foreword: O.1 Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REv.
1233, 1258 (1996).
39. In fact, the acquittal of O.J. Simpson encapsulates the impact jurors' perceptions of
illegitimacy can have on the outcome of criminal cases. Jurors who believe that officers lie
under oath, for example, or plant evidence, are more likely to have reasonable doubt about the
defendant's guilt. The police evidence is given less weight in light of their mistrust, and
opposing evidence, such as the non-fitting glove in the Simpson case, is given more weight than
it might otherwise receive.
40. For example, a Harris Poll dated February 11, 1995, found that sixty-eight percent of
blacks believed Simpson was innocent while sixty-one percent of whites believed Simpson was
guilty. See Racial Split Grows on Guilt, Innocence of O.J, Poll Finds, COM. APPEAL
(Memphis), Feb. 11, 1995, at A2.
41. See Paul Richter, Clinton to Address Split Reaction to Simpson Trial: Race Relations:
President Says He's 'Very Concerned'AboutApparent Racial Gulf L.A.TIMEs, Oct. 11, 1995,
at A4.
42. Reno Urges Officers to Try to Regain Trust; Department to Gather Data on Police
Brutality, BALT. SUN, Apr. 16, 1999, at A7.
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Consider a few other polls: a 2000 Gallup Poll found that sixty-four percent of
blacks believe that the police treat blacks less fairly than whites. 43 Nearly a quarter of
blacks indicate that they have very little confidence in the police. 44 And forty-two
percent of blacks report that they are sometimes afraid they will be arrested for a crime
they have not committed, as compared to sixteen percent of whites. 45 But where does
this perception of illegitimacy come from?
What follows are a few of the sources. While several of these sources have been
explored by scholars before, this Article goes a step further to reveal how these
sources, all but one of which are ostensibly examples of over-enforcement, also serve
as examples of under-enforcement when it comes to the police themselves. In other
words, minorities and the poor are victimized twice: they are victims of over-
enforcement, and also victims of a system that allows their victimizers to victimize
with impunity, in short, to operate in a zone of under-enforcement. In addition, this
Article demonstrates how these sites of illegitimacy also signal doctrinal gaps, or what
this Article terms "responsiveness problems."
A. Excessive Force
Perhaps nothing has tainted the image of the police-at least from the perspective
of those "on the bottom," to again borrow from Mari Matsuda-as much as highly
publicized instances of excessive force and brutality. The videotaped images of several
LAPD officers beating Rodney King with billy clubs, kicking him with their heels,
stunning him with a 50,000-volt Taser "stun gun," 46 and the initial acquittal of those
officers on brutality charges by an all-white jury,47 were enough to spark riots resulting
in forty-four deaths and an estimated billion dollars in property damage." Before
Rodney King, there was the highly publicized beating death of Arthur McDuffie, an
insurance salesman, in Miami. 49 And since Rodney King, the fatal beating of Nathaniel
43. DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE 119 (2002).
44. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
116 tbl.2.13 (2002).
45. Id. at 123 tbl.2.25; see also KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL
HOAxEs, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER
MACROAGGRESSIONS 35 (1998) (discussing other related surveys).
46. See Seth Mydans, Videotaped Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality Issue,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at Al; Hector Tobar & Richard Lee Colvin, Witnesses Depict
Relentless Beating; Police: Accounts ofRodney Glen King's Arrest Describe Repeated Striking
and Kicking of the Suspect. LAPD Officers Said King's Actions Justified the Treatment, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at B 1. As a result of this beating, King suffered eleven skull fractures, a
crushed cheekbone, a broken ankle, and brain damage.
47. See Richard A. Serrano & Carlos V. Lozano, Jury Picked for King Trial; No Blacks
Chosen, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1992, at A . The officers were acquitted in state court, see People
v. Powell, No. BA 035498 (Super. Ct. L.A. County 1991), but retried in federal court where two
were convicted. Their sentencing departures were appealed to the Supreme Court, which
affirmed in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 81-84 (1996).
48. See Tom Mathews, The Siege of L.A., NEwSWEEK, May 11, 1992, at 30.
49. McDuffie was beaten to death by several officers after he was cornered by police
following a high-speed chase for an alleged traffic violation. The police initially reported that
McDuffie's injuries were the result of McDuffie crashing his motorcycle during the chase, but
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Jones in Cincinnati, also videotaped; 50 the police beating of Robert Davis in New
Orleans, also videotaped;5' the fatal shooting of Amadou Diallo in New York-forty-
one shots, for attempting to identify himself by displaying his wallet;5 2 the sodomizing
of Abner Louima, with a broomstick, in New York;5 3 the shooting deaths of two men
and wounding of four others by New Orleans police during the immediate aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina;54 and the shooting death of Sean Bell by New York police the day
before his wedding.
55
Although there is no way to determine with mathematic certainty how widespread
incidents of police brutality are, 56 the very fact that most victims of police brutality are
later recanted this report. Based on the immunized testimony of three officers, five other
officers were indicted on charges relating to McDuffie's death. Those officers were acquitted by
an all-white jury, setting off riots that left eighteen people dead and an estimated $100 million in
property damage. See Ex-Officer Tells Court ofRole in Miami Cover-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
1980, at A11.
50. See Brenna R. Kelly, Man Dies After Brawl with City Police Officers, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Dec. 1, 2003, at IA; Stephanie Simon, City Tense After Death in Arrest, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2003, at A22. At the time, Cincinnati was undergoing police reform efforts as part of a
settlement of a federal investigation of its police practices pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141
(2000), a provision allowing the federal government to monitor and combat systematic
misconduct within local police departments.
51. The police beating of Davis, 64, was captured on videotape by an Associated Press
Television News crew detailed in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina and resulted in
battery charges being filed against the officers for using excessive force. See Christine Hauser &
Christopher Drew, 3 Police Officers Deny Battery Charges After Videotaped Beating in New
Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at A16.
52. Diallo, an unarmed immigrant from Guinea, was standing in the vestibule of his
apartment building when he was shot by an all-white squad of the NYPD's street crime unit. See
Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an Unarmed Man is Killed, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 1999, at AI; Amy Waldman, A Hard Worker with a Gentle Smile, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
1999, at B5.
53. Abner Louima was held down in a station house bathroom by a police officer while
another officer rammed a broken broomstick in his rectum. Louima required three operations
and two months of hospitalization. Officer Justin Volpe pleaded guilty to sodomizing Louima,
and Officer Charles Schwarz was convicted by a jury of aiding in the assault. See David
Barstow, Officer, Seeking Some Mercy, Admits to Louima 's Torture, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1999,
at Al; Joseph P. Fried, Volpe Sentenced to a 30-Year Term in Louima Torture, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1999, at A 1; Leonard Levitt, The Louima Verdicts, Some Splits, but Blue Wall Stands,
NEWSDAY, June 9, 1999, at A4.
54. See Shaila Dewan, Police Officers Charged in Deaths in Hurricane's Aftermath, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 29, 2006, at A 18.
55. See William K. Rashbaum & Al Baker, 50 Bullets, One Dead, and Many Questions,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006, at B 1.
56. Findings by the NAACP, based on hearings conducted in minority communities across
the country following the police beating of Rodney King, indicate that many minorities do not
file formal complaints against officers out of fear of reprisal, or discouragement, or the belief
that their complaints will not be believed. See CHARLES OGLErREE, JR., MARY PROSSER, ABBE
SMITH, & WILLIAM TALLEY, JR., BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY 4-9 (1995). Studies by
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International confirm that police brutality is in fact
widespread. See AMNESTY INT'L, AI REPORT 1998: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1998),
http://www.amnesty.it/Ailibtop/1996/AMR2510-3696.htm; HUMAN RiGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED
FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALrrY AND ACCOUNTABLrrY IN THE UNITED STATES (1998),
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members of poor and minority communities 57 should be cause for concern, and
contributes to the perception that the police are more likely to engage in force when
dealing with a minority suspect than when dealing with a non-minority suspect, a
perception for which there is evidentiary support.58 Certainly, polls indicate that
minorities consider police brutality more of a problem than whites.59 In black and
Hispanic communities in New York, for example, it is generally believed that officers
would not have fired upon Amadou Diallo had he been white, an assumption supported
by recent social cognition research examining implicit biases and the use of force.6 °
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/uspo06.htm. A study of Bronx residents reported that
twenty-five percent of a cross-section of residents reported witnessing police brutality or
harassment during an arrest. See James R. Davis, A Comparison of Attitudes Toward the New
York City Police, 17 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 233 (1990).
57. Bureau of Justice Statistics from 1996, for example, show that black and Hispanics
made up half of the documented cases of police brutality across the country, notwithstanding the
fact that they represented only about twenty percent of the population. Roberto Suro, Study Says
Cops Used Force v. 500, 000, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Nov. 24, 1997, at 21; Mydans, supra note 46, at
AI ("Court documents from several misconduct cases show that nearly all the victims of
maulings by Los Angeles police dogs in the last seven years were black or Hispanic-although
whites committed nearly a third of the crimes in which dogs are usually deployed."); see also
NEW YORK CITY CIvILAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., STATus REPORT 66 (Jan.-June 2003) (noting
that fifty-one percent of complainants alleging police misconduct between January and June
2003 identified themselves as black). For more on police brutality and race, see Hubert G.
Locke, The Color of Law and the Issue of Color: Race and the Abuse of Police Power, in
POLICE VIOLENCE 129-49 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996).
58. There is evidence that police are more likely to use deadly force during encounters with
minority suspects. Such evidence was brought to the Supreme Court's attention in Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), in which the Court analyzed Fourth Amendment limitations on the
use of deadly force. See Brief for Appellee-Respondent at 23-26, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.
1 (1985) (Nos. 83-1035, 83-1070) (citing statistical data showing "significant disparities in the
use of deadly force based on the race of the shooting victim/suspect and that virtually all of this
disparity occurs as a result of the Memphis policy that allows officers to exercise their
discretion to shoot fleeing property crime suspects").
59. For example, a poll released by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies
found that forty-three percent of blacks believe police brutality and harassment are serious
problems. Among the general public, only thirteen percent agree with this belief. See Michael
A. Fletcher, Study Tracks Blacks' Crime Concerns: African Americans Show Less Confidence in
System, Favor StiffPenalties, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1996, at A11. This is not to suggest that
blacks are the only minority group victimized by police brutality. See, e.g., COMM. AGAINST
ANTI-AsAN VIOLENCE, POLICE VIOLENCE IN NEw YORK CITY'S ASIAN AMERICAN CoMMuNrrms,
1986-1995, at 4-11 (1996) (noting the annual increase in reports of police violence against
Asian Americans). Gays and lesbians, especially those of color and those who fail to conform to
gender expectations, have also been the victims of police brutality.
60. Recent social cognition research supports the conclusion that racial schemas-racial
meanings that are activated by racial categories we map onto individuals based on their racial
group-play a role in the use of deadly force. For example, in social cognitionist Joshua
Correll's gun study, Correll and his colleagues asked participants to play a videogame in which
they were tasked with determining whether a suspect was holding a gun or an innocuous object.
The participants received points for shooting (in self-defense) the suspects brandishing guns;
they lost points for shooting suspects who were unarmed. The study found that participants were
more likely to shoot unarmed suspects who were black than unarmed suspects who were white
and less likely to shoot armed suspects who were white than armed suspects who were black.
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Beyond this research, the shooting of Timothy Stansbury, Jr., a black youth,
supports this perception. On January 23, 2004, Stansbury was taking a shortcut across
the rooftop of his building when he was fatally shot by a police officer who apparently
was startled upon seeing a black youth on the roof.6 1 That same day, the police
responded to a call that an individual on a subway platform was brandishing a gun. The
police who responded to the call were met with a barrage of gunfire when they
attempted to confront the individual, Kevin Tester. Rather than returning fire, the
police retreated, called for back up, and later talked Tester into surrendering. The
police did not fire a single shot at Tester, a white male. 62 Community members duly
noted the different results in these encounters that occurred on the same day.
63
The point is not only that the use of excessive force and police shootings contribute
to the perception of illegitimate over-enforcement, but that the use of excessive force
simultaneously points to the corollary of under-enforcement when it comes to police
offenders. The common perception is that the State is unlikely to bring indictments
against officers. For example, the State did not bring an indictment against the officer
who shot and killed Stansbury; his discipline from the police department was a mere
thirty-day suspension and the surrender of his firearm.64 Even when the government
does bring indictments, such indictments rarely result in convictions. The initial
acquittal of the officers charged in the Rodney King beating is the rule, not the
exception. Even when the officers were retried on federal charges, only two of the four
were convicted, and at sentencing the court granted their motions for sentencing
departures, a decision the Supreme Court affirmed in part in Koon v. United States.
65
The officers in the Diallo shooting were acquitted of all charges. 66 Despite
Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd & Bemd Wittenbrink, The Police Officer's
Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J.
PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1315-19 (2002). Significantly, there was no correlation
between shooter bias and explicit bias, as determined by a questionnaire to ascertain the
participant's personal views about blacks. However, there was a correlation between shooter
bias and implicit bias, as ascertained by the participant's assessment of how other whites
viewed blacks. Id.; see also John A. Bargh, Mark Chen & Lara Burrows, Automaticity of Social
Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J.
PERSONALrry & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 238-239 (1996) (showing the automatic effect of the
African American stereotype on social perception does not vary as a function of level of
consciously expressed prejudice). For further discussion of these and other social cognition
experiments suggesting the pervasiveness of implicit racial bias, and the resulting real-world
consequences, see generally Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1489
(2005).
61. See Sheryl McCarthy, Once Again, Living While Black Proves Fatal, NEWSDAY, Jan.
28, 2004, at A36. The officer who shot and killed Stansbury was not prosecuted. See Imani
Henry, Cop Goes Free in Stansbury Slaying, WORKER'S WORLD, Mar. 4, 2004, at 3.
62. See Daryl Khan & Joshua Robin, Cops Fired Upon, Make Arrest Without Firing,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 2004, at A39.
63. Indeed, the different responses to black and white offenders continue to be discussed
and debated. See, e.g., The Brian Lehrer Show: Role of Race in Racism (New York Public
Radio broadcast Jan. 3, 2007).
64. See Daryl Khan, Officer in 2004 Shooting is Given a 30-Day Suspension, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2006, at A25.
65. 518 U.S. 81, 113-14 (1996).
66. See Jane Fritsch, 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 26, 2000, at Al.
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overwhelming evidence of complicity by other officers, only two officers were
convicted of charges related to the sodomy of Louima. This suggests-and certainly
contributes to the perception-that officers themselves operate in a zone of under-
enforcement.
In addition, the use of excessive force and police shootings point to a doctrinal
responsiveness problem. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which ostensibly provides a cause of action
against state actors for civil rights deprivations, has repeatedly proven inadequate to
address problems of police brutality.67 In Rizzo v. Goode,6s the Supreme Court held
that future acts of police brutality, regardless of past pervasiveness, were too
speculative to warrant injunctive relief, a holding the Court essentially reaffirmed in
City ofLos Angeles v. Lyons.69 Municipalities themselves are normally immune from
civil liability-absent evidence of deliberate indifference to the risk of brutality. 70 In
Malley v. Briggs,7' the Court held that officers are entitled to qualified immunity so
long as their actions are objectively reasonable. Under Graham v. Connor,72 the
amount of force officers are in fact entitled to use is construed "from the perspective of
a reasonable officer on the scene, ' 73 and as Cynthia Lee has observed, this is almost by
definition a problematic standard.74 And officers themselves, often judgment proof, are
in any event usually indemnified by local authorities.75 Thus, when there are costs,
they tend to be borne by the taxpayers, not by the offenders.
67. See generally Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Needfor an Effective
Federal Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1504-
1514 (1993) (discussing the inability of private civil rights actions to curb urban police abuse);
Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle ofAbuse: Why 42 U. S. C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring
Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753 (1993) (discussing major weaknesses in § 1983 actions
and the effectiveness of such actions in deterring police officers from overstepping the bounds
of their power).
68. 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976).
69. 461 U.S. 95, 112-13 (1983) (holding lower court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
Lyons's claim for injunctive relief barring the use of chokeholds by Los Angeles officers; prior
use of chokeholds, including against Lyons, could not establish a real and immediate threat that
police would again use a chokehold against Lyons personally). In 1994, Congress restored some
potential for injunctive relief by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 14141 as part of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. It empowers the U.S. Attorney General to seek
injunctive relief against police departments based on a pattern or practice of misconduct
depriving persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. §
14141 (2000). For more on the application of this provision, see Barbara E. Armacost,
Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 453, 525-33 (2004).
70. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415-16 (1997).
71. 475 U.S. 335, 344-46 (1986).
72. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
73. Id. at 396.
74. CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 180 (2003) (noting that the reasonable man standard in excessive force
cases can incorporate negative social attitudes, biases, and racial prejudice); see also Jody D.
Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary
Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994).
75. Armacost, supra note 69, at 473.
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Criminal actions fare no better, in part due to the doctrinal hurdles the Supreme
Court erected in Screws v. United States.76 In Screws, which involved charges against
a Georgia sheriff in connection with the beating death of a handcuffed black defendant,
the Court read 18 U.S.C. § 242, which prohibits violence under color of law, as
requiring proof that the defendant had "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal
right made definite by decision or other rule of law."77 Thus, in terms of courts, there
is a responsiveness problem. All of this contributes to the perception of illegitimate and
undemocratic policing.
B. Racial Profiling
Many minority community members also believe that the police are more likely to
target them than white community members for pretextual traffic stops, that is,
investigative stops to search for drugs or other contraband, a practice the Supreme
Court gave its imprimatur to in Whren v. United States.78 Indeed, a Gallup Poll found
that forty percent of blacks who had been pulled over for traffic stops believed that the
police had targeted them because of their race.79 The percentage is even higher when it
comes to young black men: seventy-five percent believe they have been victims of
racial profiling.8° For these target groups, the perception is that being black or
Hispanic alone carries a penalty: the taint of suspicion, the risk of a traffic stop, the
risk of a canine sniff, the risk of a search. Or as Randall Kennedy argues, when it
comes to citizen-police encounters, there is a "racial tax.,
81
76. 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945). In Screws, a Georgia sheriff, along with two deputies,
bludgeoned to death a handcuffed black man. When local authorities failed to investigate the
killing, federal authorities stepped in and charged the sheriff with violating 18 U.S.C. § 242,
which prohibits violence under color of law. However, the Supreme Court vacated the
conviction, finding that the statute was impermissibly vague, and that to save the statute from
unconstitutionality, a "specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by
decision or other rule of law" must be read into the statute. On remand, the jury was presented
with the same evidence, but this time instructed that they must find that the sheriff, in
bludgeoning his handcuffed prisoner to death, had the specific intent to deprive the prisoner of a
constitutional right. Faced with this hurdle, the jury acquitted. For more on the impact of
Screws, see generally Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention ofJust
Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677 (1996) (addressing sentencing as a
critical part of the criminal justice process that bears on police brutality); David Dante Troutt,
Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in Federal Police
Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 18 (1999) (attributing much of the difficulty in
prosecuting police brutality to the overwhelming power of the stories mainstream American
culture tells about the encounters leading to police violence).
77. Screws, 325 U.S. at 103.
78. 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996).
79. See HARms, supra note 43, at 119-20.
80. See Will Lester, Most in Poll Think Police Racially Profile Motorists, ARmZ. REPuB.,
Dec. 11, 1999, at Al (citing Gallup poll finding that seventy-three percent of young black males
believe they have been targeted by the police because of their race).
81. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 159 (1997). None of this is to suggest
that racial profiling is a new phenomenon. As other scholars have pointed out, racial profiling
dates back to the 1700s and the slave patrols of that period. See generally SALLY E. HADDEN,
SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE CAROLINAS (2001) (examining the
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This perception also has factual support. A report by the Maryland State Police
found that African Americans comprised 72.9% of all of the drivers that were stopped
and searched along a stretch of Interstate 95, even though they comprised only 17.5%
of the drivers violating traffic laws on the road. 82 And while race-based policing is
usually justified, at least by those who engage in it, on the grounds that minorities are
more likely to be engaged in criminal activity,8 3 the evidence from traffic stops does
not bear this out. The Maryland Report found that the hit rates for blacks who had been
stopped and searched was in fact statistically identical to the hit rates for whites who
had been stopped and searched: the hit rate for when officers searched black motorists
was 28.4%; the hit rate when officers searched white motorists was 28.8%. 84 The
results of a study conducted by the New Jersey State Police in 2000 are even starker.
The New Jersey study found that blacks and Hispanics comprised seventy-eight
percent of the motorists stopped and searched. In terms of hit rates, the troopers found
evidence of criminal activity in thirteen percent of their searches of black motorists,
and in five percent of their searches of Hispanic motorists. By contrast, when officers
searched white motorists, they found evidence of criminal activity twenty-five percent
of the time.85 Similar studies in other jurisdictions have produced similar data.86
public regulation of slavery in Virginia and the Carolinas by focusing on slave patrols during
the period 1700 to 1865); ANDREW E. TASLrrz, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A
HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURES, 1789-1868 (2006) (exploring the history of the Fourth
Amendment during slavery and Reconstruction); William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment:
Origins and Original Meanings, 602-1791, at 432-54 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Claremont Graduate School) (available through UMI Dissertation Services) (discussing
statutory searches and seizures in the Southern Colonies to the year 1760).
82. See Wilkins v. Md. State Police, Civil No. MJG-93-468 (D. Md. 1993); see also David
A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and
Pretextual Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 563-66 (1997). The report found that
93.3% of the drivers on Interstate 95 were violating traffic laws and thus were eligible to be
stopped by the State Police. Of the violators, 17.5% were black, and 74.7% were white. See
Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REv. 333, 350 (1998) (quoting
expert report of Dr. John Lambert); Michael Schneider, State Police 1-95 Drug Unit Found to
Search Black Motorists 4 Times More Often Than White, BALT. SUN, May 23, 1996, at B2.
83. In New Jersey, for example, the superintendent of the New Jersey State Police justified
targeting minority motorists with the claim that minorities were responsible for most of the drug
trade. See Joe Donohue, Trooper Boss: Race Plays Role in Drug Crimes-but He Says Race Is a
Factor in Drug Crimes, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 28, 1999, at Al.
84. See HARRIS, supra note 40, at 80.
85. Id.; see also John Lamberth, Driving While Black; A Statistician Proves that Prejudice
Still Rules the Road, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1998, at Cl; Michael Raphael & Kathy Barrett
Carter, State Police Reveal 75% ofArrests Along Turnpike Were of Minorities, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Feb. 10, 1999, at 1.
86. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and
Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REv. 651,677-79 (2002) (finding that a study
of traffic stops revealed racial imbalance indicative of profiling); Kathleen Gorman, Avon
Police Target Black, Hispanic Drivers, Report Says, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 13, 1994, at A l
(noting practice of targeting blacks and Hispanics in Avon, Connecticut and that the supervising
sergeant had instructed his officers to find a reason to stop black and Hispanic motorists);
Joseph Neff & Pat Stith, Highway Drug Unit Focuses on Blacks, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), July 28, 1996, at Al (finding a particular squad of the North Carolina Highway Patrol
targeted blacks for pretextual stops); Roger Roy & Henry Pierson Curtis, When Cops Stop
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Racial profiling is not merely limited to those in cars. Studies have shown that black
women are targeted for searches when flying.8 7 And a disproportionate number of
blacks and Hispanics are subjected to stops while simply walking, a problem which the
Supreme Court touched on without directly addressing in Kolender v. Lawson."8 For
example, NYPD citywide stop and frisk data between 1998 and 2000 revealed that
eighty-four percent of the individuals stopped and frisked in New York City were
black or Hispanic.8 9 Between 1997 and 1998, NYPD's elite street crime unit
conducted nearly 40,000 frisks that revealed no contraband at all. 9° Most troubling,
Blacks, Drug Search Often Follows: Orange County Deputies Deny Race Plays a Role in Stops
on the Turnpike, but Some Police Officials Agree Blacks Have a Right to Be Unhappy,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 8, 1997, at Al (finding that the Criminal Patrol Unit of the Orange
County Sheriffs Office was six and a half times more likely to search black motorists than
white motorists); Brian M. Trotta, Report: Avon Police Targeted Minorities; Internal Probe
Supports Ex-Officer's Discrimination Claims, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 22, 1994, at Al. For
more on the pretextual stops of Hispanics, see generally Victor C. Romero, Racial Profiling:
"Driving While Mexican " andAffirmative Action, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 195 (2000) (discussing
racial profiling broadly as the use of race to develop an understanding of an individual).
87. A report released by the U.S. General Accounting Office found that black women
traveling internationally were nine times more likely than white women to be subjected to x-
rays or strip searches by U.S. Customs officials, even though they were less than half as likely
to be carrying contraband. Such targeting prompted a class action suit against officials. See John
Gibeaut, Markedfor Humiliation, 85 A.B.A. J. 46 (1999); Black Women Searched More, Study
Finds, N.Y. TuMEs, Apr. 10, 2000, at A17; David Johnston, U.S. Changes Policy on Searching
Suspected Drug Smugglers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999, at A14.
88. 461 U.S. 352 (1983). In Kolender, the defendant was arrested on fifteen separate
occasions for violating a California statute requiring persons who loiter or wander on the streets
to provide "credible and reliable" identification and to account for their presence when
requested by a police officer. The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
failed to clarify what is contemplated by "credible and reliable identification" and thus
encouraged arbitrary enforcement. Id. at 360-62. Although never discussed in the Supreme
Court's opinion, in fact, the defendant was a law-abiding black male with a penchant for
evening strolls. See also Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth
Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1990) (arguing that the substantial
discretion given to police officers in their confrontations with citizens has severely restricted the
liberty to walk the streets and move about the country free from government intrusion).
89. Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in
Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAw& SOc'Y REv. 513,523 (2003) (citing NEW YORK
CITY POLICE DEP'T, CrrYWIDE STOP AND FRISK DATA 1998, 1999, AND 2000(2001)). More recent
data are equally dire. Reports released in February 2007 of New York Police Department
Citywide Stop and Frisk Data 2006 reveal that blacks and Hispanics continue to be stopped in
numbers grossly disproportionate to their representation in the general public. Of the 508,540
reported stops in 2006,55% were black, 30% were Hispanic, and 11% were white. Christopher
Dunn, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: NYPD Stops and Frisks and the Fourth Amendment,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 2007, at 3. Similar findings have been made in other jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Tim Roche & Constance Humburg, Stops Far Too Routine for Many Blacks, ST. PETERSBURG
TImES (Fla.), Oct. 19, 1997, at 1A.
90. See David Kocieniewski, Success ofElite Police Unit Exacts a Toll on the Streets, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at AI; Greg B. Smith, NYPD Hit on Stop-&-Frisk Report: Minorities
Targeted, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 1, 1999, at 3.
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these rates for blacks and Hispanics remain disproportionately high even when
numbers are adjusted to reflect higher offending rates in particular neighborhoods. 9'
Regardless of whether this race-based policing is intentional or not, there is the
continuing perception, supported by evidence, that police treat citizens differently
based on their race. 92 Indeed, often the activities of the police seem unimaginable
against whites. In discussing the police beating of a black motorist for driving with a
suspended license, New York Times columnist Bob Herbert put it this way: "[T]he
charge was driving with a suspended license. This was not John Gotti the cops had in
custody. But then, Gotti would never have been treated like that.",93 The black driver's
injury resulted in permanent paralysis from the neck down. Or as an article in Essence
magazine declared while discussing racial profiling generally: "despite the decades of
enormous Black success and achievement, police continue to view Black skin itself as
'probable cause. ' ' 94
As with the use of excessive force, the pervasiveness of race-based profiling
suggests both over-enforcement and under-enforcement. Over-enforcement with
respect to the targets of profiling; under-enforcement with respect to the perpetrators of
profiling. Profiling also signals a responsiveness gap. Quite simply, the law, for the
most part, fails to protect individuals who are the victims of profiling and fails to
ensure democratic policing. So long as police claim targeting is not based on race
alone, courts tend to treat the action as beyond the purview of the Equal Protection
Clause.95 Moreover, after United States v. Armstrong, the complainant must show not
91. See Kevin Flynn, Racial Bias Shown in Police Searches, State Report Asserts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at Al (citing New York State Attorney General report which shows higher
search rates of blacks and Hispanics, even when numbers are adjusted to reflect higher crime
rates in some minority communities). Since 9/11, individuals who appear Middle Eastern, Arab,
or Muslim have also faced disproportionate questioning, detention, and suspicion. See Andrea
Elliott, After 9/11, Arab-Americans Fear Police Acts, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,2006,
at A15. For more on the targeting of people who appear Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim, see
Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1578-80 (2002).
92. See Andy Alford & Tony Plohetski, Traffic Stop Data Hint at Racial Bias-Austin
Police Numbers Show Minorities More Likely to Be Searched, Whites More Likely to Have
Contraband, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMEN (Tex.), Mar. 16, 2003; Jack Ludwig, Americans
See Racial Profiling as Widespread, GALLUP PoLL TUESDAY BRIEFING, May 13, 2003.
93. Bob Herbert, Savagery Beyond Sense, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1996, at A37.
94. Les Payne, Up Against the Wall; BlackMen and the Cops, ESSENCE, Nov. 1992, at 134;
see also Ann Belser, Suspect Black Men Are Subject to Closer Scrutiny from Patrolling Police,
and the Result Is Often More Fear, Antagonism Between Them, Prrr. PosT-GAzETrE, May 5,
1996, at A15 (discussing stop and search policies in Homestead, Pa.); Charles N. Jamison, Jr.,
Racism: The Hurt That Men Won't Name, EsSENCE, Nov. 1992, at 63 (discussing the
particularly demoralizing impact of racism on black men).
95. See e.g., United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 350-52 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
statistics showing that blacks were disproportionately targeted and finding that because the
officers had a plausible, non-racially based decision for detaining the defendant, defendant's
equal protection claim could not be sustained); United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391,394-96
(8th Cir. 1992) (permitting race as a factor in profiling so long as other factors are present); see
also Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 329 F.3d 723, 731-32 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming
summary judgment because appellant failed to provide any evidence sufficient to counter
officer's testimony that the traffic stop was not race-motivated); Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d
995, 999-1000 (8th Cir. 2003) (denying relief because plaintiff could not provide affirmative
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only a discriminatory effect but also discriminatory purpose to make out a claim of
discriminatory enforcement" This doctrinal requirement is of course unresponsive to
the concerns raised by critical race scholars of unconscious racism and implicit
biases.
97
C. Under-Enforcement on the Streets
The use of excessive force and racial profiling are clear examples of how over-
enforcement and under-enforcement converge and reinforce one another, thus
contributing to the perception of law enforcement illegitimacy. The targets of
excessive force and racial profiling, the majority of whom are innocent of any
wrongdoing, are victims of over-enforcement. At the same time, the officers who target
them benefit from under-enforcement, since their actions more often than not go
unchecked.
The next source for the perception of law enforcement illegitimacy is less intuitive
than profiling or excessive force, and does not involve over-enforcement against
minorities and the poor at all. Rather, it involves a type of under-enforcement-what
this author terms "under-enforcement on the streets" for the purpose of clarity-with
respect to poor and minority victims of crime.
As Alexandra Natapoff has recently shown, poor and minority communities can
suffer simultaneously from over-enforcement (for example, when it comes to profiling)
and under-enforcement (when it comes to the allocations of resources to respond to
crime). 98 Members of these communities are again victimized twice, but this time
differently. They are victims of under-enforcement to the extent that law enforcement
is under-responsive to crime in their communities, and they are victims again to the
extent that the law provides no recourse to remedy this under-enforcement.
evidence of discrimination to counter the officer's justification for the traffic stop); Bradley v.
United States, 299 F.3d 197, 205-07 (3d Cir. 2002) (requiring plaintiff to prove customs
officials had a discriminatory effect and were motivated by a discriminatory purpose). Mounting
a successful equal protection claim is made even more difficult by the fact that courts have
accepted racial incongruity, for example, the presence of a black person in a white
neighborhood, as a constitutionally permissible ground for an encounter or limited detention.
For more on the high standard of proof required to sustain a viable racial profiling claim under
the Fourth Amendment, see generally Andrew E. Tasiitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment
Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 2257 (2002).
96. 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (rejecting claim of race-based selective prosecution and
demand for discovery). Armstrong has since been applied to claims of race-based selective
enforcement. See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996). For a critique of Armstrong's intent-based test, see
Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege ofDiscretion, 67 FoRDrHMAmL.
REv. 13, 42-50 (1998).
97. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (reconsidering the doctrine
which requires plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of a facially neutral law to prove a
racially discriminatory purpose on the part of those responsible for the law's enactment or
administration).
98. Natapoff, supra note 8, at 1722-1744.
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Further elaboration is in order. For a host of reasons, crime perpetrators are often
imagined as black or Hispanic, 99 and crime victims as white. 100 In reality, four-fifths
of violent crimes are intraracial.101 Whites are nearly six times more likely to be
murdered by another white than by a minority. 102 Similarly, most victims of crimes
committed by black and Hispanic perpetrators are black and Hispanic themselves. As
of 2002, for example, blacks were victims of rape at a rate more than three times that
of whites, and victims of robbery at a rate more than twice that of whites. 103 Blacks
were also victims of property crimes at a higher rate. "04 Accordingly, Randall Kennedy
has argued that "the principal injury suffered by African-Americans in relation to
criminal matters is not over-enforcement but under-enforcement of the laws."' 5 The
concomitant problem is that police are often less diligent in responding to crimes
committed in minority and poor neighborhoods and devote fewer resources to solving
crimes against minorities and the poor, a socio-legal normative phenomenon that
Alexandra Natapoff addresses. 106 Research certainly confirms that "police seem to
offer less service to victims (they are less prone to offer assistance to residents and less
likely to file incident reports)" in minority communities as compared to "higher status
neighborhoods with lower crime rates."10 7 This "under-enforcement on the streets" is
endemic and must be addressed. The point here though is to focus on how "under-
99. See Armour, supra note 74, at 787 ("[Ilt is unrealistic to dispute the depressing
conclusion that, for many Americans, crime has a black face."); see generally Jon Hurwitz &
Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role ofRacial Stereotypes, 41 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 375 (1997) (asserting that social psychological theories of social stereotyping are used
to generate a series of predictions about the conditions under which whites' stereotypes of
blacks are likely to bias their evaluations of blacks in the context of crime). Part of this is also
based on societal priming. For example, it is four times more likely that local news will show a
mug shot of the accused when the accused is black rather than white, two times more likely that
local news will show the accused physically restrained when the accused is black rather than
white, and two times less likely that local news will show the name of the accused when the
accused is black rather than white. See generally ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREw RoJECrI, THE
BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA (2000) (examining the
intricate patterns of racial depiction in the mass media and how those patterns shape ambivalent
attitudes of whites toward blacks).
100. D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GEo.
L.J. 437. 499 (1993) ("[C]riminals are stereotyped as black and the innocent victims are
stereotyped as white.").
101. See KENNEDY, supra note 81, at 19.
102. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2004, at 18 tbl.2.7 (2004).
103. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2002, at
191 tbl.3.4 (2002).
104. Id. at 204, tbl.3.25.
105. KENNEDY, supra note 81, at 19. Of course, historically, it was white on black crime that
was usually ignored, as Randall Kennedy details in his examination of the failure to protect
slaves from assault, rape, and murder in the antebellum South, id. at 30-36; the failure to protect
blacks from lynchings during Reconstruction and the Jim Crow era, id. at 36-63; and the failure
to seek justice against perpetrators of racially motivated murders, assaults, bombings, and
beatings during the Civil Rights movement, id. at 63-69.
106. See generally Natapoff, supra note 8.
107. Sara E. Stoutland, The Multiple Dimensions of Trust in Resident/Police Relations in
Boston, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELiNQ. 226, 231 (2001).
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enforcement on the streets" contributes to the perception of undemocratic and hence
illegitimate policing. Specifically, the perception is that whites generally benefit from
more responsive law enforcement, whether it is the speed with which the police
respond to a 9-1-1 call, or the number of officers assigned to a case, or having a police
department offer a cash reward for information. 108 Furthermore, this disparity in police
response to crime has the expressive effect of "send[ing] an official message of
dismissal and devaluation."' 1 9
This is ostentatiously true in high profile cases, where media attention also
influences the allocation of police resources."l0 For example, Susan Brownmiller, in
her analysis of newspaper coverage of rape, found that "although New York City
police statistics showed that black women were more frequent victims of rape than
white women, the favored victim in the tabloid headline... was young, white, middle
class and 'attractive."'.l The Central Park jogger case is but one example. " 2 The case
dominated the media for months. In fact, there were 3,254 other reported rapes that
year, including "one the following week involving the near decapitation of a black
woman in Fort Tryon Park and one two weeks later involving a black woman in
Brooklyn who was robbed, raped, sodomized, and thrown down an air shaft of a four
story building."" 3 These rapes, however, were simply not newsworthy. This attention
to white female victims of crime and comparative inattention to black female victims
of crime only fuels the perception prevalent in poor and minority communities that,
when it comes to receiving protection, minority victims simply are not as important as
nonminority victims. 1 4 It is relatively easy to summon the names of white female
108. Cheryl Harris has persuasively written about whiteness itself as having a kind of
property value, as having its own currency, its own cachet:
In ways so embedded that it is rarely apparent, the set of assumptions, privileges,
and benefits that accompany the status of being white have become a valuable
asset that whites sought to protect and that those who passed sought to attain-by
fraud if necessary. Whites have come to expect and rely on these benefits, and
over time these expectations have been affirmed, legitimated, and protected by the
law. Even though the law is neither uniform nor explicit in all instances, in
protecting settled expectations based on white privilege, American law has
recognized a property interest in whiteness that, although unacknowledged, now
forms the background against which legal disputes are framed, argued, and
adjudicated.
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1713-14 (1993) (footnote
omitted).
109. Natapoff, supra note 8, at 1479.
110. See Michael Brick, Awaiting Verdict, Victim's Family Feels 2003 Killing Is Eclipsed
Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006, at BI (noting that it is "almost redundant to say," but
allocation of police resources has to do with "social status, wealth and race").
111. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975).
112. Indeed, the Central Park jogger case also signals a zone of under-enforcement. Several
youths were wrongly convicted based on their false confessions. The officers who obtained
those false confessions, however, suffered no consequences, and thus continue to operate in a
zone of under-enforcement. I thank Laura Appleman for this observation.
113. JOAN DIDION, AFTER HENRY 255 (1992).
114. See Derrick K. Baker, Many Black Women Are Missing - And So Is Media Coverage
For Them, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE (Ga.), Sept. 2, 2005, at A5; Jessica Heslam, Media Frenzy
Absent in this Brutal Story, BOSTON HERALD, May 5, 2006, at 4; Erin Texeira, 'An Unconscious
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victims: Nicole Simpson Brown, Natalee Holloway, Elizabeth Smart, Laci Peterson,
and Chandra Levy. "15 Even though black women are several times more likely to be
victims of crime, their victimization often remains invisible. More significantly, just as
increased media attention results in an increase in police resources, this under-attention
by the media to crimes against minority victims translates into a reduced allocation of
resources deployed to respond to such crimes. This in turn increases the perception of
undemocratic policing.
As with the use of excessive force and profiling, this under-enforcement on the
streets also signals a doctrinal gap and a responsiveness problem. Simply put, in a
society of negative rights, 16 minority members and other politically vulnerable groups
that receive unequal protection from law enforcement have little recourse. Put simply,
absent proof of intentional racial discrimination, or other unconstitutional basis for
discrimination, the deployment of resources, including police resources, in unequal
measure is not actionable. " 7 Because of a doctrinal failure, jurisdictions can continue
to deploy resources disproportionately. All of this contributes to the perception of
illegitimate policing.
D. The Courts
What this Article has attempted to do is set forth just some of the sources for the
perception that the police themselves lack legitimacy. Unfortunately, one of the
consequences of this perception is that many residents of high-crime communities-
the communities where we are most in need of community-police cooperation-"have
come to see the police as just another gang," 18 an occupying force. " 9 Tellingly, this
perception is supported not only by polls and the work of other scholars, but also by
Bias'?, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH (Va.), June 20, 2005, at A4 ("To be blunt, blond white
chicks who go missing get covered, and poor, black, Hispanic or other people of color who go
missing do not get covered."); Women of Color Ignored in Media Coverage ofMissing Women,
Girls, MEDIA REP. TO WOMEN, Apr. 1 2005, available at 2005 WL 8936837.
115. It is perhaps telling that the black females who come to mind are Tawana Brawley and
the accuser in the Duke Lacrosse team rape case, both famously discredited as non-victims.
116. The negative rights theory to constitutionalism, which the Supreme Court has
repeatedly endorsed, holds that the state is under no constitutional obligation to provide services
to its polity. See Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due
Process Clause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 982, 1010-11 (1996) (describing the "negative liberties"
approach to constitutionalism).
117. Cf DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-203
(1988) (holding that the state could not be held liable in a failure to protect case, since nothing
in the due process clause requires the state to protect citizens against private actors); see also
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 768-79 (2005) ("[Tlhe Fourteenth
Amendment ... did not create a system by which police departments are generally held
financially accountable for crimes that better policing might have prevented."); David A.
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1165, 1280-87 (1999) (describing traditional
view that police protection is immune from due process claims).
118. David K. Shipler, Living Under Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at A33.
119. See generally CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST. AT HARvARD LAW
SCH., NAACP & WILLIAM MONROE TROTrER INST., BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY: AN
INVESTIGATION OF POLICE CONDUCT IN MINORITY COMMuNmES (1995).
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those members of the "black CNN,"' 20 hip hop artists and stand-up comics. From Jay-
Z rapping about overzealous cops in "99 Problems"121 to N.W.A. rapping about police
brutality in "Fuck the Police"122 to Public Enemy proclaiming "911 Is a Joke." 123 From
Chris Rock's satiric self-help video "How to Not Get Your Ass Kicked by the
Police" 124 to Dave Chappelle's comedic routine about the advantages of driving while
white. 125
This Article focuses on the police more than other arms of justice for a reason. The
police, more than the courts, more than the legislature, and more than prosecutors, are
the public face of the law. 126 But this does not mean that courts are excluded from
120. Chuck D of the rap group Public Enemy coined this phrase in the 1980s. Public Enemy
- Biography, http://www.hiponline.comlartistlmusic/p/ public-enemy/index.html.
121. In "99 Problems," Jay-Z raps about being pulled over by the cops because "I'm young
and I'm black and my hat's real low," though the cop claims it is because he is doing "fifty-five
in a fifty-four." When the cop tries to conduct a search, Jay-Z asserts his rights, leading to the
title of the song:
Well my glove compartment is locked so is the trunk and the back
And I know my rights so you gon' need a warrant for that
"Aren't you sharp as a tack, you some type of lawyer or somethin'?
Or somebody important or somethin' ?"
Nah I ain't pass the bar but i know a little bit
Enough that you won't illegally search my shit
"We'll see how smart you are when the K-9 come"
I got 99 Problems but a bitch ain't one.
JAY-Z, 99 Problems, on THE BLACK ALBUM (Def Jam Records 2003). The lyrics have been
featured on the Volokh Conspiracy law blog, and are available at
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2004_12_19-2004_12_25.shtml.
122. Lyrics include:
Young nigga got it bad cuz I'm brown
And not the other color so police think
They have the authority to kill a minority
Fuck that shit, cuz I ain't tha one
For a punk muthafucka with a badge and a gun
To be beatin on, and throwin in jail
We could go toe to toe in the middle of a cell
Fuckin with me cuz I'm a teenager
With a little bit of gold and a pager
Searchin my car, lookin for the product
Thinkin every nigga is sellin narcotics
N.W.A., Fuck tha Police, on STRAIGHT OuTrrA COMPTON (Ruthless/Priority 1988) (lyrics
available at http://www.lyricsdepot.com/n-w-a/fuck-tha-police.html).
123. PUBLIC ENEMY, 911 Is a Joke, on FEAR OF A BLACK PLANET (Def Jam Records 1990).
124. The Chris Rock Show: How to Not Get Your Ass Kicked by the Police (HBO 2002),
available at http://www.ifilm.com/ifilmdetail/2458063.
125. Dave Chappelle: Killin' Them Softly (HBO 2000).
126. For example, one of the recurring complaints in minority communities in the 1990s
concerned the devastating impact the 100 to 1 crack/cocaine ratio was having on communities
of color. See, e.g., STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR 12-26
(1994) (discussing impact of war on drugs and crack/cocaine disparity on certain minority
groups). However, while the legislature was responsible for this ratio, and prosecutors were
responsible for prosecuting these cases, law enforcement officers were seen as the ones
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criticism. As discussed previously, doctrinal gaps signal responsiveness problems, for
the most part denying recourse to victims of profiling, excessive force, and street
under-enforcement. If the police are often perceived, especially in poor and minority
communities, as an occupying force, the courts are often perceived as an enabling
force. 127
As an illustration of this point, consider Terry v. Ohio.'28 In Terry, the Court
considered for the first time whether a person could be detained in the absence of
probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime. On its face, such a seizure
seemed to violate the clear language of the Fourth Amendment. However,
acknowledging rising crime rates, the Court held that as long as an officer had specific
and articulable facts, that is, reasonable suspicion, to believe that "criminal activity
may be afoot,"1 29 the Fourth Amendment permitted a limited detention and questioning
of the person. Expressing concern for the safety of officers,' the Court also went a
step further: If the officer also had reasonable suspicion that a person was armed and
dangerous, the officer could couple the limited detention and questioning with a pat
down for weapons-in common parlance, a stop and frisk. 131
responsible for arrests and for the rise in incarceration rates.
127. Lindsay N. Kendrick, Alienable Rights and Unalienable Wrongs: Fighting the "War on
Terror" Through the Fourth Amendment, 47 How. L.J. 989, 1031 (2004) ("If citizens feel that
members of the community are wrongfully targeted by the police and that there is no recourse in
the courts, it may appear that the branches of government are working together-law
enforcement acts according to bias and the courts condone it.").
128. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
129. Id. at 30.
130. As the Court put it:
We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating
crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in
taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed
with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
Id. at 23. The Court went on to note that "every year in this country many law enforcement
officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded." Id. That police safety
was crucial to Chief Justice Warren's thinking in Terry is also documented in two biographies.
See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 466-68 (1997); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 686
(1983).
131. In fact, Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion paid only cursory attention to the
authority of officers to engage in stops. Rather, the crux of the Court's opinion dealt with the
authority of officers to engage in frisks. The Court adopted the following standard for frisks
where probable cause is lacking:
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads
us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he
has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual,
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.
The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is
whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the
belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether
the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not
to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific
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Interestingly, the Warren Court explicitly recognized that stop and frisk practices,
which the police had engaged in for years, 32 were not race-neutral, and were likely to
have a disproportionate impact on disadvantaged groups. Indeed, both Terry and his
codefendant were black, 133 though the Court's opinion elides this fact. Moreover, the
Court implicitly acknowledged that as a consequence of its decision, this
disproportionate impact on disadvantaged groups would continue. In a nutshell, the
Warren Court balanced the need of law enforcement officers to engage in aggressive
police tactics to root out crime against the right of minority communities to be free
from race-based practices. And poor communities as well. The simple fact is that
police also treat individuals differently based on their perceived status in society,
which status is often determined by class. Studies confirm, for example, that police
officers are significantly less likely to search vehicles driven by those with above-
average incomes than vehicles driven by those with below-average incomes. 134 With
the scale calibrated this way, law enforcement won. And though this is still debated,13
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (citation omitted).
132. John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A LookInside the Supreme Court's
Conference, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 749, 758 (1998).
133. See Louis Stokes, Representing John W. Terry, 72 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 727,729 (1998).
Perhaps not surprisingly, the arresting officer could not say what initially attracted his attention
to Terry and his companion-he described them as two Negroes-other than to say that he "just
didn't like 'em." Id. at 730 (quoting Detective McFadden). For an argument that traces the
Court's insensitivity to racial targeting in United States v. Whren to the Court's tactical decision
to minimize the issue of race in Terry v. Ohio, see Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999).
134. See, e.g., Donald T. Campbell & H. Laurence Ross, The Connecticut Crackdown on
Speeding: Time-Series Data in Quasi-Experimental Analysis, 3 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 33 (1968);
Patrick T. Kinkade & Matthew C. Leone, The Effects of "Tough" Drunk Driving Laws on
Policing: A Case Study, 38 CRIME & DELINQ. 239 (1992); Stephen D. Mastrofski & R. Richard
Ritti, You Can Lead a Horse to Water... : A Case Study of a Police Department's Response to
Stricter Drunk Driving Laws, 9 JUST. Q. 465 (1992). Of course, disaggregating status from race
from class is often difficult. The civil rights activist Bayard Rustin noted as much in describing
New York's stop and frisk law, which had been implemented in the 1960s pre-Terry:
Whatever its provisions or its purposes, this law is a nefarious example of class
legislation, for its effect is to permit harassment of the poor. No police are going to
stop and frisk well-dressed bankers on Wall Street-but they don't hesitate to stop
well-dressed Negro businessmen in Harlem and go through their attach6 cases.
That kind of brusque police action is reserved for the poor and minorities like
Negroes and Puerto Ricans.
NAT'L CTR. ON POLICE & CMTY. RELATIONS, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE AND COMMUNITY
RELATIONS 18 (1967) (quoting Bayard Rustin).
135. Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares, for example, have argued that the institutionalized
racism that prompted our existing criminal procedure regime is a thing of the past, and that what
is needed now is a regime that allows police more discretion-such as was allowed in Terry--
not less. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86
GEo. L.J. 1153 (1998). Dorothy Roberts, on the other hand, argues for a return to criminal
procedure safeguards to combat race-based policing. Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and
the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 775
(1999).
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many believe minorities and the poor lost. Which is why scholars such as Tracey
Maclin and Adina Schwartz 136 have criticized the trade-off the Court sanctioned in
Terry and its impact on disadvantaged communities.
But this is not the only way the Court enabled police to engage in discriminatory
practices. The Court also enabled police by endorsing an amorphous category short of
probable cause called "reasonable suspicion." This category is so malleable that
reasonable suspicion is often reconfigured into to whatever a law enforcement officer
wants it to be at any given moment. Or to borrow from Justice Thurgood Marshall,
articulating reasonable suspicions is little more than a "'chameleon-like way of
adapting to any particular set of observations."" 37 This is especially true when it
comes to profiling, where race is always present, even if unstated. Justice Marshall's
string cite of cases in which a suspect matched one of the DEA's profiles speaks
volumes:
Compare, e.g., United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 (CA6 1982) (suspect
was first to deplane), with United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980)
(last to deplane), with United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29,31 (CA2
1980) (deplaned from middle); United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.3d 9, 12 (CA4
1980) (one-way tickets), with United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 (CA6
1977) (round-trip tickets), with United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717,720 (CA6
1977) (non-stop flight), with United States v. Sokolow, 808 F.2d 1366, 1370 (CA9
1987), vacated, 831 F.2d 1413 (CA9 1987) (changed planes); Craemer, supra, at
595 (no luggage), with United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 343 (CA5 1981)
(gym bag), with Sullivan, supra, at 12 (new suitcase); United States v. Smith, 574
F.2d 882, 883 (CA6 1978) (traveling alone), with United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d
1218, 1219 (CA5 1980) (traveling with companion); United States v. Andrews,
136. E.g., Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police
Discretion, 72 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1271, 1278 (1998) ("One of the flaws of Terry was that this
shift [to a reasonableness standard rather than a probable cause standard] was implemented
without a full examination of the consequences for blacks and other disfavored persons...
[and] provided a springboard for modem police methods that target black men and others for
arbitrary and discretionary intrusions.... For this reason alone, the result in Terry deserves
censure."); Adina Schwartz, "Just Take Away Their Guns ": The Hidden Racism of Terry v.
Ohio, 23 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 317, 365-73 (1996) (summarizing studies of the impact of Terry
on minority communities); see also Omar Saleem, The Age of Unreason: The Impact of
Reasonableness, Increased Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry "Stop and Frisk," 50
OKLA. L. REv. 451 (1997) (concluding that Terry and its progeny have resulted in
discriminatory practices against blacks).
137. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987)). Randall Kennedy makes a
similar point in discussing race and reasonable suspicion:
Reasonableness, then, is not a definite, arithmetic, objective quality that is
independent of aims and values. It is a concept that is considerably more subtle,
complex, malleable, and mysterious than the simplistic model of decision making
relied upon by those who accept at face value the "reasonableness" or "rationality"
of conduct that not only expresses controversial moral and political judgments but
that also deep-seated, perhaps unconscious, affections, fears, and aversions.
KENNEDY, supra note 81, at 144-45.
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600 F.3d 563, 566 (CA6 1979) (acted nervously), with United States v.
Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 992 (CA5 1977) (acted too calmly). 138
To make matters worse, the Court continued this implicit sanctioning of race-based
practices in Whren v. United States,'39 in which the Court rejected a Fourth
Amendment challenge to a pretextual car stop designed to search for drugs and other
contraband. In Whren, the defendants, who had caught the attention of vice-squad
officers of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Force, were pulled over after the officers
observed them turn without first signaling. The vice-squad officers apparently saw this
as an opportunity to conduct a stop, and perhaps secure a consent search. 140 As things
turned out, a consent search was unnecessary since one of the officers testified that
when he approached the vehicle after pulling it over, he "immediately observed two
large plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine in petitioner Whren's
hands."14' The occupants later challenged their arrest on the ground that the stop was
138. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 13-14.
139. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
140. Again, perhaps I'm being overly generous, or just naive, in speculating that the officers
hoped to secure consent. It's possible that they planned to order the driver out of the car, which
officers have an automatic right to do under Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), and
then observe a bulge, permitting them to frisk the driver under Terry. Or even conduct a frisk
without seeing a bulge, simply because they were black men in a Pathfinder. After all, in United
States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Fifth Circuit upheld a frisk of a
man with an open can of beer in one hand and his other hand in his pocket, reasoning:
[The officer's] concern for his safety, dramatized by the recent loss of his friend [a
fellow officer killed in the line of duty], is hardly groundless in this day and age.
The number of officers killed annually in the line of duty has tripled since Terry
was decided; the numbers of those assaulted and wounded have risen by a factor
of twenty. Surely the constitutional legitimacy of a brief patdown... may and
should reflect the horrendously more violent society in which we live, twenty-five
years after Terry.
Id. at 844 (footnote omitted). Or maybe the officers planned to arrest the driver and occupant,
thus allowing them to conduct a search of their persons, as a search incident to arrest, see United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and the interior of the car as the "grab area," see New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Of course, afterwards, the officers could search the rest of
the Pathfinder as an inventory search. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987). Or in the
alternative, the police could have simply detained the driver under Terry until a canine dog
could be brought over, since canine sniffs of vehicles don't require a warrant, United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), and Terry itself does not contain a time limit. United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985). And if the dog alerted, the officers would probably have enough
to conduct a warrantless search of the car under the Carroll doctrine. Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925). Or maybe the officers hoped the occupants would toss any contraband out
of the car, thus abandoning any Fourth Amendment interest in the contraband. The possibilities
are endless. Indeed, the Court has given officers so much leeway-sometimes explicitly,
sometimes by merely looking the other way-that Justice Stevens has lamented the Court has
become "a loyal foot soldier in the Executive's fight against crime." California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565, 601 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Whren, 517 U.S. at 809. The story of the officers is a story in itself. Both officers have
been the subject of repeated misconduct allegations, including allegations of planting evidence,
providing false testimony, and using excessive force. For more on their story, including one
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pretextual and based solely on the fact that they were black men in a Pathfinder.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, rejected this argument, and concluded that so long
as the stop itself was based on an actual traffic violation, the subjective motivation of
an officer in singling out a particular motorist is irrelevant under the Fourth
Amendment. 142 By so holding, the Court essentially green-lighted the police practice
of singling out minorities for pretextual traffic stops in the hope of discovering
contraband, a practice that was repeated, without comment from the Court, in the
recent case of Illinois v. Caballes.143 A practice that minorities know as being
penalized for driving while black, driving while brown.
As Tracey Maclin, 14 4 David Harris, 145 and Devon Carbado' 46 have well
documented, these race-based encounters in turn are often fraught with intimidation,
harassment, and disrepect. The Court, as enabling these practices, thus becomes "law
as microaggression."1
47
None of this is good for criminal justice, let alone for reducing crime. To borrow
from Angela Davis, "When people of color experience injustices that are tolerated and
even sanctioned by courts and other criminal justice officials, they develop distrust and
disrespect for the justice system."148 And this has significant consequences for levels
of crime that exist in communities.
III. ILLEGITIMACY AND TESTILYING
A. Illegitimacy and Small Rebellions
As discussed in Part II, the Court in Terry v. Ohio acknowledged that its decision
was likely to have a disproportionate impact on disadvantaged communities. It also
officer's subsequent indictment on perjury charges, see Kevin R. Johnson, The Story ofWhren
v. United States: The Song Remains the Same, at 20-21, in RACE AND THE LAW STORIES (Devon
Carbado & Rachel F. Moran eds., 2006).
142. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis."). The Court expressly left open the possibility that such
discriminatory conduct might be sanctionable under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. But see
David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment,
1997 Sup. CT. REv. 271. This, however, amounted to an empty gesture given the hurdles the
Court has erected to frustrate equal protection claims. For more on these hurdles, see Wayne R.
LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop " From Start to Finish: Too Much "Routine, " Not Enough
Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1843, 1860-61 (2004).
143. 543 U.S. 405 (2005). Officers ostensibly pulled over Caballes, a Hispanic male, for
driving seventy-one miles per hour in a sixty-five miles per hour speed zone, and used the
traffic stop as an opportunity to conduct a canine sniff of the vehicle. The Court held that the
canine sniff did not require reasonable suspicion. Id. at 409.
144. E.g., Maclin, supra note 82.
145. E.g., David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 679-81 (1994).
146. E.g., RACE AND THE LAW STORIES, supra note 141.
147. I borrow this term from Peggy Davis who uses it to describe the ways in which
minorities are often perceived in the legal system, which in turn has led many minorities to view
the legal system as biased. Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1576
(1989).
148. Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MAMI L. REv. 425,442 (1997).
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recognized the larger negative impact this disparate treatment might have on crime
overall. Allowing the police more discretion to conduct stops and frisks, and hence
engage in discriminatory treatment, came with a risk: that those most discriminated
against would respond not with submission or deference, but with civil unrest. Thus, at
a certain level, the Warren Court was aware of the relationship between legitimacy and
crime. As the Court noted in two footnotes:
While the frequency with which "frisking" forms a part of field interrogation
practice varies tremendously with the locale, the objective of the interrogation,
and the particular officer it cannot help but be a severely exacerbating factor in
police-community tensions. This is particularly true in situations where the "stop
and frisk" of youths or minority group members is "motivated by the officers'
perceived need to maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes
accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control of
the streets." 149
We have noted that the abusive practices which play a major, though by no means
exclusive, role in creating this friction are not susceptible of control by means of
the exclusionary rule, and cannot properly dictate our decision with respect to the
powers of the police in genuine investigative and preventive situations. However,
the degree of community resentment aroused by particular practices is clearly
relevant to an assessment of the quality of the intrusion upon reasonable
expectations of personal security caused by those practices.'
5 0
Although scholars have interpreted the second footnote differently, what seems
clear is that Chief Justice Warren was concerned about civil unrest and violence. The
period leading up to the Court's decision in Terry saw not only the assassinations of
President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, but repeated rioting in urban
centers. 151 That many of the riots were reactions against mistreatment by the police did
not escape the Court. In fact, it could be argued that Chief Justice Warren was simply
articulating delicately what his law clerk, in a memo concerning the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.'s amicus brief to the court, had put more bluntly.
That memo asserted in the clearest terms possible that "the power of the police on the
basis of suspicion to interfere with an individual's freedom of movement and right of
privacy... [is] not unconnected with the rioting which has plagued the Nation's cities
in recent years."' 52 Moreover, just three months prior to the Court's ruling in Terry v.
Ohio, the Kerner Commission released its findings on the causes of recent urban
149. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.II (1968) (citation omitted).
150. Id. at 17 n.14.
151. See, e.g., Looting... Arson ... Death... As Riots Swept U.S. Cities, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Apr. 15, 1968, at 10; Mobs Run Wild in the Nation's Capital, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Apr. 15, 1968, at 8; Widespread Disorders, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1968, at 1. For a
more thorough discussion of the "long hot summers" of riots in the years leading up to Terry,
see STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE
NATION, INDIVISIBLE 158-69 (1997).
152. See Barrett, supra note 132, at 771.
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riots. 153 Their findings were unambiguous and to the point: hostility between the police
and minority communities was not only a contributing factor to urban unrest and
violence-in some places, it was the sole factor. As the Commission put it, "Negroes
firmly believe that police brutality and harassment occur repeatedly in Negro
neighborhoods. This belief is unquestionably one of the major reasons for intense
Negro resentment against the police."' 54
The Warren Court was well aware of these events,' 55 and cited the findings of an
earlier commission, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, in its decision.' 56 On its face, then, Terry was concerned
about a potentially extreme consequence of its decision: civil unrest and disobedience
through violence.
In one respect, the Warren Court saw not only the small picture (the immediate
disparate treatment minorities would continue to face) but the large picture (the
potential for civil unrest). In another respect, however, the Warren Court may have
been blind to the other ramifications of its Terry decision in particular and of police
practices in general. I say this for two reasons. First, the practice of discriminatory
stops was, and continues to be, only one of many sources of distrust of the police in
poor and minority communities. This is not to suggest that discriminatory stops are
insignificant. Far from it. Much discontent, especially from law-abiding members of
poor and minority communities, can be traced to discriminatory stops. After all, as the
driving-while-black studies demonstrate, most of the minorities targeted by the police
153. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMMISSION REPORT].
154. Id. at 302. A prior commission reached a similar conclusion to the Kerner Commission,
finding that:
Misuse of field interrogation ... is causing serious friction with minority groups in
many localities. This is becoming particularly true as more police departments
adopt "aggressive patrol" in which officers are encouraged routinely to stop and
question persons on the street who are unknown to them, who are suspicious, or
whose purpose for being abroad is not readily evident. The Michigan State survey
found that both minority group leaders and persons sympathetic to minority
groups throughout the country were almost unanimous in labeling field
interrogation as a principle problem in police community relations.
U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OFJUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE POLICE 184 (1967).
155. As described by Earl Dudley, the law clerk who worked for Chief Justice Warren on
Terry v. Ohio and its companion cases, the historical setting of Terry played a significant role.
There was the backdrop of the Civil Rights movement, opposition to the Vietnam War, and, just
two months before Terry was decided, the outbreak of riots in many cities, including
Washington, D.C. In addition, the Court had repeatedly come under attack for championing
individual rights at the expense of law enforcement. Moreover, the Court had become a target
during the 1964 presidential campaign, and was expected to become a target again in the 1968
campaign. Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A
Law Clerk's Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 891,892-93 (1998). For more on the attacks on
the Court during this period and the political climate at the time, see FRED P. GRAHAM, THE
SELF-INFLICTED WOuND 8-15 (1970).
156. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.l I (1968).
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are in fact law-abiding citizens penalized simply for having the "wrong" skin color. 157
But discriminatory stops are only one aspect of discriminatory policing.
Second, the Warren Court was blind to the larger ramification insofar as the only
non-compliance it imagined was further rioting, something akin to the riots that
occurred in Los Angeles in 1992 following the acquittal by an all-white jury of officers
charged with beating Rodney King. But of course non-compliance can take more
subtle forms, and one of the ambitions of this Article is to impress that when there is a
failure of legitimacy-for example, when the police themselves operate in and benefit
from a protective zone of under-enforcement-there are smaller rebellions. Not
assisting the police by providing information about a crime. Disregarding jury duty, or
serving but voting to acquit a guilty defendant to send a message about police
practices. Disregarding the law. Believing laws exist to be broken. And while the
possibility of a big rebellion is obviously cause for concern, society should also be
concerned with these small rebellions. After all, it is these small rebellions that lead to
higher crime levels. And higher crime levels in turn impact economic levels and civic
involvement.
Is there evidence that the perception of illegitimacy leads to small rebellions?
Consider the following. Recall the fatal shooting of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed
immigrant from Guinea, by an all-white squad of the NYPD's street crime unit in
February 1999. At the time, crime in New York City was on the decline.' But a
review of crime trends during the first quarter of 1999 reveals a month-long spike in
crime across the board following the Diallo shooting, 159 then a resumption of a decline
in crime following the officers' indictment on murder charges. 160 Their acquittal in
February 2000 is also interesting-again, another spike in crime, this time lasting
several months. 161 And while there are many possible explanations for this pattern,
certainly one is that there is a correlation between the perception of legitimacy and
levels of crime.
Again, the point is that the perception of illegitimacy may result in an increase in
crime overall. Which means that, to the extent crime reduction is a goal, one place to
begin is law enforcement legitimacy.
New York City began this process with its Courtesy, Professionalism, and Respect
campaign in 1996, supplemented in 1999, following the Diallo shooting, with courtesy
157. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
158. Andy Newman, Crime Rate in New York City Fell 8 Percent in Early '99, F.B.I. Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1999, at B5.
159. See CRIME ANALYSIS UNIT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS AND PLANNING,
STATISTICAL REPORT, COMPLAINTS AND ARRESTS 6 (2001) [hereinafter STATISTICAL REPORT].
While the police attributed this spike to a downturn in aggressive patrolling after the Diallo
shooting, critics dismissed this explanation noting, among other things, that the level of
patrolling could not explain a spike in domestic violence arrests, or that the greatest spike
occurred in Brooklyn, not the Bronx where the Diallo shooting occurred. See Kevin Flynn,
Experts Wonder if Crime Drop Is Near End, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, at Al; Kevin Flynn,
Rebound in City Murder Rate Puzzling New York Officials, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1999, at Al.
160. STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 159, at 6; see also David Barstow, After Officers'
Indictment in Diallo Case, Arrests Drop in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1999, at B3
(noting number of arrests in April 1999 fell to 30,134 from 35,813 in March 1999).
161. STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 159, at 6.
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cards, little reminders to officers to act courteously. 162 This was a step in the right
direction, and crime rates have generally dropped since the NYPD initiated the
program. Still, the program is arguably mostly cosmetic. Legitimacy theory suggests
that crime rates could drop even more if substantive changes were made.
This of course begs the question of where to begin. After all, as discussed in Part I,
there are numerous reasons for the perception that police officers benefit from a double
standard, are unfair, and are biased. To change how those in high crime communities
perceive the police, all of these sources of perceived illegitimacy, from those that may
seem innocuous (such as cops, including off-duty cops, getting a pass when they
violate the traffic laws without justification) 163 to those that truly shock the conscience
(such as sodomizing Abner Louima), must eventually be addressed. Moreover, the
realm of policing as a zone of complete under-enforcement should end. This requires a
paradigm shift in how society treats law enforcement officers who cross the line, as
well as doctrinal changes both large and small.
B. Beginning the Paradigm Shift
In the remainder of this Article, I hope to begin this process of changing how
society responds to law enforcement wrongdoing by narrowing my focus to one area of
illegitimacy. It is the area this Article opened with, an area that often signals over-
enforcement against civilians, particularly minorities and others politically
disadvantaged, as well as under-enforcement against police officers: testilying.
There are several reasons to begin with testilying. First, testilying undergirds other
areas where there is the perception of illegitimacy. Police brutality persists, at least in
part, because officers are aware that they can misrepresent the truth with impunity. 164
And racial profiling thrives, at least in part, because officers know they can
misrepresent their motives for conducting stops without consequences.' 65 This
suggests that a reduction in testilying might have the collateral effect of contributing to
a reduction in brutality and profiling.
The second reason for beginning with testilying is that, relatively, it is an easier fix.
As demonstrated above, there are a plethora of doctrinal hurdles that make eradicating
the use of excessive force and racial profiling difficult. Some scholars-Richard Banks
comes to mind-have even argued that racial profiling is so ingrained that it cannot be
eradicated.1 66 These hurdles are considerably fewer and lower when it comes to
testilying, a point this Article expands upon in Part III.C.
162. Michael Cooper, Cue Cards Offered to Remind Officers of Good Manners, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 7, 1999, at Al.
163. This occurs more frequently than many realize. See, e.g., David Kidwell & Dan
Keating, Cops and Crashes: The Unwritten Rule, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 13, 1996, at Al
(examining crash reports involving officers and finding that police departments almost never
ticket their own officers, even when they are clearly at fault).
164. See INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 9-15 (1991).
165. Perhaps for this reason, Tracey Maclin has described perjury as "part and parcel of the
process used to deny black motorists their substantive rights under the Fourth Amendment." See
Maclin, supra note 82, at 381-82.
166. R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L.
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There is a third reason to begin with testilying: the relative ease in building
consensus. The line between legitimate use of force and excessive force is often a gray
one; racial profiling, however publicly maligned, is often privately tolerated; and there
are legitimate reasons for allocating police resources unequally. As such, it may be
difficult to build consensus around curbing excessive force, profiling, or under-
enforcement on the streets. Testilying, by contrast, tends to be more uniformly
condemned. Indeed, independent of the utilitarian argument put forward in this Article
for reducing testilying, there is another, more fundamental argument: testilying is
morally wrong. As such, it should be easier to unite legislators, courts, and the bar in
addressing testilying in a meaningful way.
Finally, there is another reason to begin with testilying. Testilying implicates not
only those who engage in it, but those who permit it to exist. As ministers of justice,
prosecutors-the attorneys who are positioned to enable testilying-have a duty to
truth. 167 Their role is not only to prosecute the guilty, but to protect the innocent.
Indeed, as the Court made clear in Mooney v. Holohan, 68 a prosecutor violates due
process when she knowingly introduces false testimony: "[Dieliberate deception of
court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured . . . is ...
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice." 69 Due process is also violated
when a prosecutor fails to correct false testimony. 170 Moreover, a host of ethical rules
prohibit prosecutors from knowingly introducing false testimony. Rule 3.4(b) of the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not . . . counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely."' 17' Similarly,
Standard 3-5.6(a) of the American Bar Association Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, provides that a
prosecutor "should not knowingly offer false evidence, whether by documents,
tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses, or fail to seek withdrawal thereof
upon discovery of its falsity.' 172 Combating testilying is not only the utilitarian and
practical thing to do, but also the right and ethical thing to do.
REv. 571 (2003) (arguing that policymakers should abandon efforts to eliminate racial profiling
because such efforts will prove futile, and should focus on addressing the race-related
consequences of the practice).
167. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[The prosecutor's] interest, therefore,
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."); see also
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 3-
1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993); MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1983) ("A prosecutor has
the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L REsPONsIBILrrY EC 7-13 (1981).
168. 294 U.S. 103 (1935); see also Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); Pyle v. Kansas,
317 U.S. 213 (1942) (holding allegation of knowing use of perjured testimony sufficiently
charged a deprivation of due process rights).
169. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112.
170. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) ("[A] conviction obtained through use of
false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence,
allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.")
171. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (1998).
172. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
standard 3-5.6(a) (3d ed. 1993).
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C. The Pervasiveness of Testilying
Officers telling "white lies"--or what this Article terms "blue lies"-is nothing
new. Indeed, blue lies have existed as long as there have been restraints on police
activity. Consider, for example, how the police responded to the Supreme Court's
decision in Mapp v. Ohio. 7 3 Prior to Mapp, the police for the most part could violate
the Fourth Amendment without jeopardy to a criminal case; the remedy for a defendant
whose rights had been violated, absent state protections, was a suit in trespass for
damages, or in replevin for the return of items seized. The Supreme Court changed that
with Mapp and imposed an exclusionary rule, previously applicable only in federal
cases, 74 on the states: evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment would
henceforth be excluded. Officers responded to Mapp not only by criticizing it; they
also circumvented it by manipulating the facts and telling blue lies. All of a sudden,
there were more "dropsy" cases. Instead of the evidence being found on the suspect, it
had been dropped by the suspect, and hence abandoned, making it admissible
notwithstanding Mapp. Just a few years after the Court decided Mapp, Irving Younger,
a former prosecutor and criminal court judge, described the sea change this way:
Before Mapp, the policeman typically testified that he stopped the defendant for
little or no reason, searched him, and found narcotics on his person. This had the
ring of truth. It was an illegal search.., but the evidence was admissible ....
Since it made no difference, the policeman testified truthfully. After the decision
in Mapp, it made a great deal of difference. For the first few months, New York
policemen continued to tell the truth about the circumstances of their searches,
with the result that the evidence was suppressed. Then the police made the great
discovery that if the defendant drops the narcotics on the ground, after which the
policeman arrests him, then the search is reasonable and the evidence is
admissible. Spend a few hours in the New York City Criminal Court nowadays,
and you will hear case after case in which a policeman testifies that the defendant
dropped the narcotics on the ground, whereupon the policeman arrested him.
Usually the very language of the testimony is identical from one case to
another. 1
75
Other observers also noted the sharp rise in dropsy cases following Mapp, 176 which
again suggests that perjury, or telling blue lies, is not new. To borrow from Morgan
Cloud, perjury "is a national problem and has been for decades."' 177
173. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
174. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court held for the first time that the
Fourth Amendment barred the use at trial of evidence secured through an unlawful search or
seizure. However, its decision, which was based essentially on the Court's supervisory power
over federal courts, was limited at the time to federal prosecutions.
175. Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596-97.
176. Michael Juviller, another prosecutor, reached the same conclusion:
Before Mapp, the gamblers and addicts would have the contraband in their mouths
or on their persons, and this stuff was seized from the suspects' mouths or
waistbands, but in 1961, after Mapp, the criminal community started much more
than before to drop these items to the ground, abandoning them and obviating [the
need for] probable cause.
Michael R. Juviller, A Prosecutor's Perspective, 72 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 741,742-43 (1998). The
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Nor is perjury any real secret. In the early 1970s, the Knapp Commission
investigated the NYPD and concluded that corruption was causing officers to testify
falsely and prepare false investigative reports. 178 Two decades later, the Mollen
Commission was impaneled to study the same problem: police corruption in the
NYPD. Not only did the Mollen Commission find that perjury was still a problem, but
also it found that "the practice of police falsification in connection with such arrests is
so common in certain precincts that it has spawned its own word: 'testilying." 179 The
Mollen Commission also identified perjury as "probably the most common form of
police corruption facing the criminal justice system," especially in drugs and weapons
cases. 8 0 The Commission found a litany of manufactured tales:
For example, when officers unlawfully stop and search a vehicle because they
believe it contains drugs or guns, officers will falsely claim in police reports and
under oath that the car ran a red light (or committed some other traffic violation)
and that they subsequently saw contraband in the car in plain view. To conceal an
unlawful search of an individual who officers believe is carrying drugs or a gun,
they will falsely assert that they saw a bulge in a person's pocket or saw drugs and
money changing hands. To justify unlawfully entering an apartment where
officers believe narcotics or cash can be found, they pretend to have information
from an unidentified civilian informant or claim they saw the drugs in plain view
after responding to the premises on a radio run. To arrest people they suspect are
guilty of dealing drugs, they falsely assert that the defendants had drugs in their
possession when, in fact, the drugs were found elsewhere where the officers had
no lawful right to be.' 8 1
increase in "dropsy" cases is also discussed in Note, Effect ofMapp v. Ohio on Police Practices
in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 87, 94-96 (1968). Empirical data confirms the
increase in "dropsy" cases following Mapp. See Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for
Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan Police Practices 1960-62, 4 CRIM. L. BULL.
549, 549-50 (1968).
177. Morgan Cloud, Judges, "Testilying, "and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341,
1347 (1996).
178. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION & THE CITY'S ANTI-
CORRUPTION PROCEDURES, THE KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION 83--84,96-
97 (1972) [hereinafter KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT].
179. This term was apparently coined by police officers. See MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 6.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 38. This is not to suggest that testilying does not exist in other situations. As
others have mentioned, testilying also occurs in the interrogation context. See H. RICHARD
UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR'S YEAR ON THE STREETS WITH THE NEW
YORK CrrY POLICE 116 (1988); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to
Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1037, 1038-39 (1996). An officer might manipulate the truth
as far as the timing of when he administered Miranda warnings, or whether he scrupulously
honored a suspect's invocation of the right to counsel as required by Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477 (1981), or right to silence as required by Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). In
the alternative, an officer might lie about whether he conveyed any threats or promises that
might implicate due process concerns. Finally, an officer might tell blue lies about the substance
of a statement, especially as to what facts were offered by the suspect as opposed to suggested
by the officer, which is one reason why false statements are often difficult to uncover. Finally,
officers might tell blue lies in the context of whether and how consent was obtained, one of the
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Blue lies are so pervasive that even former prosecutors have described them as
"commonplace"' 8 2 and "prevalent."' 83 Surveyed prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges believed perjury was present in approximately twenty percent of all cases. 84 A
separate survey of police officers was even more sobering. Seventy-six percent of
responding officers agreed that officers shade the facts to establish probable cause;
forty-eight percent believed judges were often correct in disbelieving police
testimony. 185 Alan Dershowitz maintains that "almost all" officers lie.'8 6 And as
Restropo-the case this Article opened with-demonstrates, perjury continues to be a
problem.
The long-term consequences to a society that fosters a culture where blue lies are
tolerated should give everyone cause for concern. As the Mollen Commission noted,
"When the police lose their credibility, they significantly hamper their own ability to
fight crime and help convict the guilty."' 87 Again, the Simpson case is instructive.
Immediately following the Mark Fuhrman revelation, a study of prospective jurors in
New York found across-the-board skepticism about police testimony. 118 As Michael
Vecchione, the Deputy in Charge of Trials in the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office
put it, "'Our prosecutors now have to begin their cases defending the cops. Prosecutors
have to bring the jury around to the opinion that cops aren't lying. That's how much
the landscape has changed.." 8 9
The reluctance of jurors to credit police testimony and resulting acquittals may be
the least of our problems. This is because legitimacy theory suggests that the less
legitimate police appear to be, the less likely it is that citizens will voluntarily comply
issues Judge Weinstein found problematic in United States v. Restrepo, 890 F. Supp. 180
(E.D.N.Y. 1995).
182. Younger, supra note 175, at 596.
183. UVILLER,supra note 181, at 116.
184. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary
Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 75, 107 (1992).
185. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of
Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016, 1050-51 & n.129 (1987).
186. ALAN M. DuRSHowrrz, THE BEST DEFENSE, at xxi (1982) ("Almost all police lie about
whether they violated the Constitution in order to convict guilty defendants."); see also Alan
Dershowitz, Controlling the Cops; Accomplices to Perjury, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1994, at A17
(discussing widespread police perjury in New York City).
187. MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 36.
188. See Joe Sexton, Jurors Question Honesty of Police, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1995, at B3.
The comments from prospective jurors ranged from the assessment that "'depending on what's
at stake, the police will lie,"' to the sentiment that officers would now have to prove they were
telling the truth. Id. As one prospective juror put it, she would listen to an officer's testimony,
but now reserve judgment until she had determined "'just how bogus a story he was telling."'
Id.
189. Id.; see also David Kocieniewski, Perjury Dividend-A Special Report; New York Pays
a High Price for Police Lies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1997, at A l (noting, among other things, the
difficulty of finding jurors who believe police accounts and that the resulting distrust is
especially acute in minority communities); Clifford Krauss, Bratton Announces Plan to Train
Officers to Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at B3 (noting that the "perception that police
officers make false arrests, tamper with evidence and commit perjury has led to scores of
acquittals... [and] was reinforced during the O.J. Simpson trial, when [Detective Fuhrman]
was found to have boasted about tampering with evidence and lying in court to win
convictions").
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with the law and with social norms of behavior. Indeed, illegitimacy, or more
specifically the perception of illegitimacy, not only reduces voluntary compliance. It
signals and induces non-compliance. For many, the perception of illegitimacy means
one thing: If the police break the law, so can I. This might help explain the correlation
between communities where the police are perceived to function outside of the law and
communities that have high crime rates. Clearly, our response to testilying needs
rethinking. The next section attempts to do just that.
D. Testilying: A Modest Proposal
To date, the proposed remedies for police abuses have focused on disciplinary
actions, either internal or external, and civil actions. Robert Batey, for example, has
argued that the best way to remedy police abuses is through internal police disciplinary
reform. 190 More recently, Judge Keenan of the Southern District of New York has
advocated a slight variation: external discipline based on a sliding scale of penalties.
If the police are misbehaving to the degree suggested ... why could not a system
be devised whereby, depending upon the seriousness of the constitutional violation
by the police, the individual officer could be penalized? The penalty could range
all the way from dismissal from the force, the most extreme, through fines, down
to loss of vacation time, or merely a reprimand for the less serious violations. If
we have been able to create a sentencing grid of forty-three levels with six
criminal history categories for the scores and scores of criminal violations in the
United States Code, I don't see why we could not grade the degree of violation by
the law enforcement official. This punishment would result in the admission of the
evidence and the punishment of the two guilty parties: The criminal defendant and
the offending policeman. I recognize, obviously, that this suggestion is
controversial, but I submit that if there is a real desire to curb police excesses in
the Fourth Amendment area, this might be the way to do it rather than to penalize
society by suppressing guns, narcotics and other contraband. 191
Neither of these solutions is satisfactory. Internal discipline alone is an inadequate
remedy, especially given the blue wall of silence and the brotherhood of loyalty among
officers. 192 There is also evidentiary support to believe that internal sanctions, standing
alone, are insufficient to deter police from misconduct. The Mollen Commission found
evidence of police supervisors instructing their officers how to lie so that evidence
obtained in violation of the Constitution would not be suppressed. 193 Other examples
190. Robert Batey, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations Through Police Disciplinary
Reform, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 245,252-56 (1996); see also Carl McGowan, Rule Making and
the Police, 70 MICH. L. REv. 659, 690 (1972) (discussing internal discipline).
191. Hon. John F. Keenan, The Proper Balance: Exclusion of Evidence or Expulsion of
Police Officers, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1376, 1380 (1998).
192. For more on the "code of silence" followed by officers to protect fellow officers, and
evidence of officers lying to protect their brethren, see ANTHONY V. BOUZA, TnE POLICE
MYSTIQUE: AN INSIDER's LOOK AT COPS, CRIME, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 83 (1990).
193. MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 40-41; see also JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN,
CITY POLICE 386-88 (1973) (describing the role supervisors play in abetting the submission of
false search warrant applications).
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of supervisors expressing their unwillingness to investigate and discipline officers
abound.'94 The likelihood that these same supervisors would willingly and fully
cooperate in an internal disciplinary regime is doubtful at best.
More to the point, any regime based solely on a disciplinary procedure, be it
internal or external, suffers from a more fundamental flaw: it reifies a double standard.
The civilian witness who commits perjury and is found guilty will face criminal
sanctions that will likely include imprisonment, not to mention collateral consequences
such as loss of employment and disenfranchisement. On the other hand, under an
internal-sanction-only regime, an officer who commits the same or similar crime--by
telling blue lies and thus committing perjury-will face a reprimand, loss of vacation
time, fines, or at worst, dismissal from the force. Such a regime would only add fodder
to the perception, already prevalent in poor and minority communities, that the police
benefit from an undeserved immunity, get a pass when they violate the law, and that
the shields they wear are shields in more ways than one.' 95 In short, the police
themselves operate in an under-enforcement zone.
Others, including Akhil Amar and Christopher Slobogin, have suggested employing
a damages regime to curb police abuses. 196 Slobogin, who has focused specifically on
testilying, has been most vocal in this regard. Under Slobogin's proposal, courts would
be more flexible in determining probable cause, allowing officers more discretion and
hence reducing the need some officers feel to bend the truth to justify their actions. At
the same time, Slobogin advocates an abolition of the exclusionary rule and the
creation of a liquidated damages remedy.197 Borrowing from Robert Davidow,
Slobogin proposes that jurisdictions create ombudsmen to receive and investigate
complaints against the police. 198 An officer found in bad faith violation of the
Constitution would be liable for a percentage of his salary, while the government
would pay an equivalent sum for good-faith violations.'99 At bottom, Slobogin's
argument is that officers will be deterred from violating the Constitution if they are the
ones to suffer consequences, and if those consequences affect their wallets. Even
setting aside the myriad problems with abolishing the exclusionary rule, the concern
with Slobogin's proposed remedy as applied to testilying is similar to the concern with
any remedy predicated on internal discipline. While it is a step in the right direction of
194. See, e.g., Williams C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 311,350 (1991) (providing as an example a police executive who stated "he was
reluctant to invoke internal discipline against deliberate violators who do not act in a clearly
arbitrary fashion and do not cause substantial harm").
195. Cf DOUGLAS W. PEREZ, COMMON SENSE ABOUTPOLICE REVIEw 100 (1994) (discussing
how confidentiality of internal affairs investigations "affects the externally perceived legitimacy
of the internal review system").
196. Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757, 811-16
(1994) (proposing damages regime); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the
Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. RV. 363 (proposing a damages regime as an alternative to
the exclusionary rule).
197. To be sure, Slobogin does not reject perjury prosecutions, but rather believes perjury
prosecutions would be less effective in deterring wrongdoing than a damages regime. Slobogin,
supra note 196, at 402-05.
198. Id. at 387.
199. Id. at 387-90.
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penalizing officers for telling blue lies, it is ultimately an insufficient step since again it
reifies a double standard. Put differently, it would only contribute to the perception that
the criminal justice system is unfair and that its very agents are permitted to function
outside of the law. While such a double standard might on the surface give law
enforcement more leeway in fighting crime, legitimacy theory suggests that this double
standard might actually disadvantage society in reducing crime.
This Article puts forward a different proposal, radical perhaps in its simplicity. We
should police the police. An officer witness who commits perjury by telling blue lies
should be investigated and prosecuted to the same extent a civilian witness would be.
The advantage of this approach is that it does not require an abandonment of the
exclusionary rule or any other overhaul of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Nor does
it require the creation or appointment of ombudsmen to investigate complaints. It does
not even require new criminal statutes, since statutes already exist to punish police
officers who engage in blue lies. In the federal system, several statutes come to mind
that could be used to prosecute officers who engage in blue lies.200 Analogous statutes
exist in state jurisdictions. 20'
One can imagine Christopher Slobogin's response to this proposal. Or rather
anticipate his response, since his work on testilying suggests that punishing officers
with perjury convictions would not reduce testilying. Indeed, he suggests that it might
"well reinforce the 'us-against-them' attitude that encourages further deceit. ' '2m But
even assuming perjury convictions would not have a deterrent effect (already a
questionable proposition) the second part of Slobogin's argument-that increased
policing of the police "may well reinforce the 'us-against-them' attitude [and]
encourage further deceit"-is problematic. After all, from the point of view of
members of poor and minority communities-that is, the communities that most matter
under legitimacy theory-not policing the police reinforces an "us-against-them"
attitude. Actually policing the police by holding them to the same standard as civilians,
by contrast, is likely to instill the belief that the law applies to everyone: rich and poor,
black and white, brown and yellow, regardless of whether the individual is wearing a
blue uniform.2 °3
200. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 1001, 1621, 2236 (2000). Section 1001, which governs
statements generally, makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully make any material false
statement or representation in any matter within the jurisdiction of any agency of the United
States, essentially covering statements made in federal criminal proceedings. Section 1621,
which proscribes perjury, makes it a crime to willfully testify, or subscribe to written testimony
such as an affidavit, falsely. Section 242 makes it a crime, under color of law, to deprive
someone of rights protected by the Constitution by reason of his color or race; § 2236 makes it a
crime to conduct a warrantless search of a dwelling or to maliciously and without probable
cause search any other property.
201. See, e.g., CAL. PENALCODE § 118 (West 1970); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 268, § 1 (Michie
1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 131-1 (West 1969); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.15 (McKinney 1975);
see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(1) (1980).
202. Slobogin, supra note 181, at 1055.
203. Policing the police should also make the system more transparent, which again would
ultimately contribute to better policing. Cf Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in
Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 911,916 (2006) (noting that the "gulf between criminal
justice insiders and outsiders.. . hinders public monitoring of agency costs.., leaving insiders
too much room to indulge their own preferences at the expense of outsiders' interests").
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A more legitimate concern is that prosecutors, invoking prosecutorial discretion,
will not prosecute. After all, statutes already exist on the books, and yet have not
resulted in anything more than isolated perjury cases. As Irving Younger has observed,
a "policeman is as likely to be indicted for perjury by his co-worker, the prosecutor, as
he is to be struck down by thunderbolts from an avenging heaven.,, 204 Which is not
surprising. Prosecutors need cases. Officers make cases. A priori, prosecutors need
officers. 20 5 It's like a marriage-one that runs smoothly most of the time but
occasionally devolves into accusations, recriminations, infidelities, retaliations, and
reconciliations. 206 Prosecutors have a disincentive to cause a rift by bringing perjury
charges.
20 7
However, again there are two simple remedies: One, where there is reasonable
suspicion that an officer has engaged in testilying, investigation should be mandatory
and two, where the investigation establishes probable cause to believe that testilying
occurred, prosecution should be mandatory. In the federal system, Department of
Justice policy already limits the discretion of prosecutors to decline prosecution in
certain cases. 20 8 States have also moved toward limiting prosecutorial discretion,
notably in the area of domestic violence. 209 Compulsory prosecution is also a common
204. Younger, supra note 175, at 596.
205. See, e.g., Jay S. Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: The Case Against the
Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REv. 339, 358 n.75 (1994) ("The institutional tendency to
tolerate police perjury likely stems from the prosecutor's interest in maintaining smooth
working relations with police, who gather the government's evidence and are often its most
important witnesses at trial, and from the prosecutor's own competitive drive to win and
advance professionally."). Monroe Freedman made this point back in the 1960s. See Monroe
Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEo. L.J. 1030
(1967).
206. I saw this several times when I was a prosecutor. Things would be going fine, and then
all of a sudden a tiff would develop between us and some agency. The tiff could be about
anything, and on occasion involved our view that an officer assigned to a joint task force was
not being truthful. Sometimes we worked things out immediately. Other times, like a married
couple, there would be accusations, then the silent treatment. If things got really bad, the agency
would stop bringing us cases, and instead take their cases to the District Attorney's Office or to
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York. And since cases were our
lifeline, the basis for our federal funding, we would find a way to kiss and make up.
207. See BOuzA, supra note 192, at 71; Armacost, supra note 69, at 466 (noting that
prosecutors may be sensitive to the need to maintain a good working relationship with officers);
Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall ofSilence" as Evidence of Bias and Motive to
Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Prrr. L. REv. 233, 263 (1998) (similar).
208. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATroRNEY's MANUAL § 9-27.400 (2007)
(requiring prior approval before dismissing readily provable charges). Prosecutorial discretion
has also been circumscribed by mandatory minimum sentences. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
(2000) (prescribing mandatory five-year consecutive sentence for use of gun during a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (prescribing five-
and ten-year mandatory sentences for narcotics offenses).
209. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.2901 (West 2003) (establishing a "pro-prosecution"
policy for domestic abuse cases, even when the victim objects); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.075
(West 2004) (requiring mandatory arrests). For a discussion of such policies, see Cheryl Hanna,
The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1505 (1998); G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence,
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feature of regulatory agencies2 1° and European jurisdictions. Nor would requiring
mandatory investigation and prosecution in cases involving testilying be difficult.
21 2
And as Erik Luna has persuasively argued, less discretion would in fact contribute to
democratic policing.2 13 Finally, the advantage of mandating investigation and, where
probable cause is established, prosecution, is that officers would be less likely to
blame, and hence retaliate against, prosecutors, especially where separate prosecutors
are designated to handle such cases. After all, under this regime the prosecutors would
lack the discretion not to investigate.
As for what events should trigger a mandatory investigation, this Article suggests a
two-tiered approach. Where a judicial officer makes an adverse credibility
determination about a law enforcement officer, a mandatory investigation should be
automatic. However, since judges, for numerous reasons, are often loath to make such
findings, 2 14 any grant of a suppression motion should also trigger some type of
investigation, or at least some oversight mechanism before such an investigation can
be declined. Here, the peer reviews suggested by Barbara Armacost, albeit in a
different context, could be extremely effective.215 Such oversight could even include
subjecting certain officers to routine polygraph exams following the grant of
suppression motions, to build on a proposal made by Donald Dripps.216 In addition,
and the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REV. 237 (2005);
Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113
HARv. L. REV. 550 (1999). Similar restrictions on prosecutorial discretion exist with respect to
drug cases. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 220.10 (McKinney 1999) (restricting
prosecutor's discretion with respect to mandatory drug sentences).
210. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 216-35 (2d ed. 1975).
211. For example, in Germany, prosecutors are required by statute to "take action in case of
all acts which are punishable by a court and capable of prosecution," and failure to so prosecute
is itself a crime. See StrafprozeBordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] § 152, translated
in 10 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES 87 (Gerhard O.W. Mueller ed., Horst
Niebler trans., 1965).
212. And should this prove inadequate, legislatures could always enact penal statutes to
specifically target testilying. For example, legislatures could make it a crime for any law
enforcement officer to willfully make a false statement in any judicial proceeding.
213. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1120 (2000) (arguing for
"systematic visibility of policing decisions and concomitant justifications" as a means of
making law enforcement more democratic and trustworthy).
214. Judges are often reluctant to make adverse credibility determinations against an officer
"on the record." Instead, judges tend to grant suppression motions on the "more acceptable"
ground that, even crediting the officer's testimony, the evidence was insufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. I thank my colleague Alafair Burke for reminding me of
this practice. On the reluctance of judges to make adverse credibility determinations against
officers generally, even in the face of overwhelming evidence of perjury, see Dershowitz, supra
note 186.
215. See Armacost, supra note 69, at 533-54. Although Armacost advocates the use of peer
reviews for responding to citizen complaints against officers, her proposal would also work for
reviews of decisions to decline prosecutions following a grant of a suppression motion where
officer credibility has been called into question. Under such a peer review system, a committee
comprised of prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges not affiliated with the case would
participate in reviewing declinations of prosecution.
216. See Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIm. L. &
CRimINOLOGY 693, 703 (1996).
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although this may be harder to implement, a mandatory and automatic investigation
should be required in the case of "repeat offenders"--those cases where an officer's
testimony has repeatedly led to the granting of suppression motions. Indeed, it may be
that by focusing on "repeat offenders," prosecutors can maximize reducing the
perception of illegitimacy. This is because while many officers may tell blue lies, the
most egregious offenders-and the ones that drive the perception of illegitimacy-are
probably in a small minority.217
One can anticipate another response to this proposal: that perjury cases are difficult
to prove. The response here is twofold. First, while some cases are difficult to prove,
this is not a reason to forego investigations or prosecutions. Rather, it provides a check
to ensure that the actual prosecutions that proceed against officers for testilying are the
cases that can be proved and that such prosecutions do not function as an over-
deterrent, but instead encourage police to do the work they do best--fighting crime. By
the same token, requiring a mandatory investigation, as well as mandatory prosecution
where probable cause is established, will ensure that prosecutors do not look the other
way when faced with evidence of blue lies. Finally, just as the public understands that
not all cases of perjury are provable, the public will understand that not all cases of
police perjury will be provable. 218
Second, the fact of the matter is that perjury cases are not always difficult. Mark
Fuhrman was quickly convicted of perjury. Furthermore, prosecutions in these cases
would have the expressive function of demonstrating a commitment to eradicating the
zone of under-enforcement in which police officers are perceived to operate. Consider
the recent shooting of Katherine Johnson, an elderly woman, in Atlanta, Georgia,
during the execution of a search warrant. 2 19 After obtaining a "no knock" warrant by
217. As Malcolm Gladwell recently pointed out, the common perception is that police
troubles have a normal distribution, "that if you graphed them the result would look like a bell
curve, with a small number of officers at one end of the curve, a small number at the other end,
and the bulk of the problem situated in the middle." The Christopher Commission's
investigation into excessive force in the L.A.P.D. following the Rodney King beating proved
this assumption false. Studying allegations of excessive force made between 1986 and 1990, the
Christopher Commission found that most officers had never been accused of anything. Rather,
only a small fraction were "repeat offenders." Of approximately 8500 officers, only 183 had
four or more complaints against them, forty-four had six or more complaints, sixteen had eight
or more, and one had sixteen complaints. As Gladwell put it, if you were to graph the troubles
of the L.A.P.D., "it wouldn't look like a bell curve. It would look more like a hockey stick," or
what statisticians refer to as a "power law" distribution. This suggests a small concentration of
problem officers, and suggests that removing this small concentration could result in a mostly
clean police department, especially since these outliers often influence the culture of their
precincts. Viewed in this way, this Article's proposal is a modest one indeed. For more on
problem officers and power law distribution, see Malcolm Gladwell, Million-Dollar Murray:
Why Problems Like Homelessness May Be Easier to Solve Than to Manage, NEW YORKER, Feb.
13, 2006, at 96.
218. The point here is again one of transparency. The mere fact that communities will see
that some cases are being prosecuted, while others are not, and will understand why, will
contribute to trust and legitimacy, allowing "community members and law enforcement [to
dispel] harmful misperceptions" and move beyond "fingerpointing." Luna, supra note 213, at
1193.
219. Shaila Dewan, Fatal Raid Linked to Lies for Warrant in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
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claiming that the target had security cameras outside the house, officers surrounded
Ms. Johnson's home, pried open her burglar bars and broke down the door.
220
Apparently afraid she was being burgled, Ms. Johnson responded with gunfire.22 1 The
officers returned fire, killing her. 222 This tragedy was compounded during a subsequent
investigation into the police shooting that revealed the police lied repeatedly to obtain
the warrant. Believing that a kilogram of cocaine was in the house-based on the
statement of a recent drug arrestee-the officers tried to get an informant into the
house to make a drug buy. 223 When that failed, they simply lied. They drew up a
warrant, claiming that a drug buy had been made from a dealer named "Sam" at the
target house, and that a "no knock" warrant was needed because Sam had security
cameras outside of the house. 224 None of this was true. On top of this, after the
shooting, the police approached an informant and asked him to claim, falsely, that he
had bought crack cocaine from Ms. Johnson's home. 225 The informant told federal
investigators of the attempted cover up, and one of the members of the search team has
told federal investigators of the lies made in the search warrant application. 226 Some
cases are easy. One of the ambitions of this Article is to induce prosecutors to pursue
them.
IV. ON LEGITIMACY AND UTILITARIANISM
The concern of this Article is larger than blue lies. Rather, the main concern of this
Article is reducing crime by inducing voluntary compliance with the law. One way to
accomplish this goal is by eliminating the double standard that allows the perception
that law is illegitimate. Put differently, we should not turn a blind eye when officers
engage in misconduct. To the contrary, we should hold police accountable for the
utilitarian reason that this would result in a reduction of crime in the general
population.
There is a counter-argument that will be made: that policing the police for anything
but the most egregious abuses-like sodomizing Abner Louima-will tie the hands of
the police, deal a blow to law enforcement, and allow bad guys to remain on the street.
And intuitively, this counter-argument has some appeal and may even be right. In the
short term.
But consider the long term. After all, legitimacy theory suggests that increased
policing of the police would increase the perception that the criminal justice system is
fair, and result in a significant diminution of crime in a host of ways. One, and perhaps
most importantly, individuals who perceive the system to be fair will be more likely to
voluntarily comply with the law and social norms. Two, individuals who perceive the
system to be fair will be more likely to "perform their duty as citizens" and voluntarily
assist the police in maintaining an ordered society.227 Too often in poor and minority
12, 2007, at A17.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. This is particularly important when it comes to enlisting the aid of Muslims and others
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communities, police attempts to gather information about past or ongoing crimes are
met with silence and hostility, not because community members support crime, but
because they distrust the police and question the fairness of the justice system. Sadly,
this community "wall of silence" occurs even when a cop has been shot in the line of
duty and the police are attempting to locate the perpetrator. The same reluctance plays
out in other stages of the criminal process, from not crediting police testimony, to
voting to acquit defendants notwithstanding proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
guilt. 228 Three, increased policing of the police might even have a positive impact on
criminal defendants themselves. Consider the following. Over thirty years ago, the
New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Crime (the "Hughes Committee")
conducted a study of prison inmates in maximum security facilities in New York.
Despite the passage of time, their findings, especially with regard to the attitudes of
inmates, is still instructive. They found that most inmates believed that they had not
received adequate representation and believed that they had been treated unfairly by
the justice system. But the Hughes Committee also found that efforts to rehabilitate
inmates were being frustrated because of the inmates' experience with the justice
system. The Hughes Committee concluded that no program of rehabilitation could be
effective on a "'prisoner who is convinced in his own mind that he is in prison because
he is the victim of a mindless, undirected, and corrupt system of justice.' 229 This
suggests that changing the perception that the police are above the law could actually
aid in the rehabilitation of prisoners.
There is another counter-argument: that increased policing of the police would in
fact contribute to a perception of illegitimacy by exposing police wrongdoing. This
argument has some merit, but not enough. Quite simply, it assumes that prosecuting
officers who engage in wrongdoing will reveal corruption. But while this may be true
for those who have little or no contact with the criminal justice system, this will hardly
be the case with those in high crime communities where perceptions of illegitimacy
and undemocratic policing are already strongly held. In these communities especially,
police wrongdoing is treated as "how life is," not news. Given that it is precisely these
communities where a reduction of crime could have the most impact, the concern that
policing the police would exacerbate problems by "outing" public wrongdoing seems
misplaced.
Moreover, there are numerous other collateral advantages to increased policing of
the police. Consider the "broken windows" approach to crime reduction. First
advanced by James Wilson and George Kelling, the approach is predicated on the
hypothesis that eliminating visible signs of disorder will deter more serious crime.
230
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The approach has gained so much currency that many champion it with contributing to
falling crime rates across the nation.2 But taking the approach seriously also means
that policing the police across the board, including for "smaller" offenses like
testilying, might actually reduce the occurrence of more "serious" offenses such as
fabricating evidence or engaging in brutality. This possibility is too important to
dismiss.
Increased policing of the police will also weed out the few "bad apple" officers who
are responsible for much of the negative perception about law enforcement. This could
yield a couple positive results. One, that more police-citizen encounters will be with
good cops, that is, that people will have fewer interactions with bad cops. If this holds,
their perception of law enforcement will adjust accordingly, resulting in greater respect
for law enforcement, and quite possibly greater safety for officers. 232 Two, such a
weeding out process would also likely change the culture of many station houses,
addressing the organizational feature of police misconduct that Barabara Armacost has
identified.233 Instead of corruption breeding corruption,2 4 there could be honesty
breeding honesty, adherence to the law breeding adherence to the law.
Increased policing of the police could even contribute to a more diverse police
force. Unfortunately, police forces in large cities continue to be disproportionately
white, not to mention disproportionately male,235 while the individuals they target
continue to be disproportionately people of color. The lack of minority representation
is especially acute in the upper echelons of departments. To use New York again, as
recently as 2001, only nine of the NYPD's 465 police captains were African-
American. 236 Part of the lack of diversity stems from hostility to minorities.13' But part
231. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New
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of this is also attributable to the perception, especially prevalent in poor and minority
communities, that the police are the bad guys-they administer the law unfairly, and
themselves function outside the law. Given this perception, it should come as no
surprise that lack of diversity is a problem.
238
Perhaps most importantly, each of these results could quite possibly reinforce the
other. A more diverse force could contribute to increased respect for the cops and vice
versa, which in turn could contribute to police safety, which in turn could reduce
occasions for the police to use excessive force, changing the culture of police
departments.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to make a cogent argument, palatable to civil
libertarians, crime control advocates, and perhaps most importantly, to the police
themselves, that increased policing of the police across the board can actually result in
a reduction of crime in the general population and better, safer policing.
Still, one can imagine the hesitation. One can even sense the gut reaction: that the
focus is all wrong, that if we want to reduce crime, we have to focus on "getting the
bad guys." And this is true. Criminals should be punished as part of a larger goal of
reducing crime. That being said, focusing on the bad guys does not mean that we
should not also focus on law enforcement officers, especially when the two overlap.
And especially when focusing on both can quite possibly benefit society at large by
reducing crime overall.
Crime rates are still too high for us to become complacent about thinking through
new approaches to crime reduction. We need more ideas. And once we think through
new ideas, we need to implement them. The ideas may not all succeed. Great
experiments may fail. But if we are to take seriously the possibility of reducing crime,
and take seriously the prospect of "mak[ing] America what America must
become', 239 -fair, egalitarian, responsive to needs of all of its citizens, and truly
democratic in all respects, including its policing-we must at least try. This Article is
about making a start.
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